LETTER FROM PRAGUE JOSE YGLESIAS

THE NATION

JANUARY 9, 1967 35 cents

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Rise of the CIA

HOW FOGGY BOTTOM LOST ITS SPIES

SMITH SIMPSON

Anti-Missiles

New Twist in the Arms Spiral

GEORGE C. WILSON

American Catholicism

The Wind from Rome

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LETTERS

use of silence

San Gabriel, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: In over fifty locations across the nation every Wednesday from 12 noon to 1 P.M., there are held Silent Vigils in protest against the war in Vietnam.

This type of protest is rapidly increasing and is particularly effective in widening the concern and making available a method of dissent to many who would otherwise refrain from overt dissent. The Weekly Silent Vigil for Peace gives such persons an avenue for showing their concern and sorrow over the tragedy of our involvement and, in addition, is a weekly confrontation of the issue and a call to others to get involved. These vigils have varied in size from as few as eight persons to a high of 300 in one location. The Silent Vigil is a visible and continuing protest against the tragedy of our involvement in Vietnam.

The originator of the idea is Charles Hubbell, 1060 Randolph Road, Santa Barbara, Calif.; he has established a clearinghouse for all interested in this form of protest. All indications are that this is a successful and effective means of dissent, especially in the atmosphere of increasing frustration and despair.

Robert H. Simmons

translating Agnon

Cambria Heights, N. Y.

DEAR SIRS: I congratulate Curt Leviant for writing—and you for publishing—his perceptive and illuminating essay on Shmuel Yosef Agnon ["Nobel Laureate of Hebrew Literature," Dec. 12]. As a student of Jewish literature, I am sometimes asked why Agnon is so difficult to translate, and Leviant has given the reader an insight into this problem, as well as an intelligent appreciation of his work and stature. *Harold U. Ribalow*

whose speedometer?

San Bernardino, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: Just to be sure you don't miss this: ". . . two photographers driving separate cars said they couldn't keep up with the President despite traveling 80 to 85 miles an hour, and faster in some spurts."

"The White House, using figures from an official log, said Johnson 'drove at a moderate speed' on his way to church along a fog-bound highway Sunday."

Above are excerpts from a news item published in the San Bernardino (Calif.) *Evening Telegram*, Dec. 5. *Clifford M. Turner*

sick pay

New York City

DEAR SIRS: Selig Greenberg is mostly right in criticizing the philosophy of Medicare: use the present organization of medical care and add a financial mechanism for paying its costs ["The Medicare Bonanza," *The Nation*, Nov. 14]. This almost guarantees that our major problems of medical economics will remain with us, namely, the inefficient operation of hospitals (Sweden's hospitals give better care than ours with 60 per cent of the personnel we use), the antiquated fee-for-service solo medical practice (where earning his income is at least as important a factor as the proper thing to do for the patient in the doctor's daily decisions), and most sharply, the nursing homes operated for profit. . . .

I foresee years of grappling with the problems of costs and quality of care consequent to the conflict be-

(*Continued on page 62*)

EDITORIALS

A Break?

A certain amount of distortion and plain lying is as essential to waging war as are men and materiel. In this respect the Vietnamese War has been in the standard pattern. On the matter of downed U.S. aircraft, for instance, the official United States and North Vietnamese communiqués have never agreed. The enemy has always claimed more planes than we have been willing to concede. The gap has been equally wide on civilian casualties resulting from U.S. bombing. The bombings of Hanoi on December 13 and 14 were marked by the usual reports of civilian casualties and the usual Pentagon denials. (See editorial, "Peace and the Pentagon," *The Nation*, January 2.) But then a new element emerged. A short UPI dispatch of December 22 carried a State Department admission that it was "almost certain" U.S. bombings had struck civilian areas of Hanoi, "but if they accidentally did," the United States regretted it.

But more extraordinary developments were in train. As this acknowledgment was put on the wires, Harrison Salisbury, of *The New York Times*, was flying to Hanoi from Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, aboard an aircraft of the International Control Commission.

Salisbury's first dispatch from Hanoi practically obliterated any area of dispute over the December 13-14 bombings. "Hanoi," he wrote, "is a very large, sprawling city . . . the built-up, densely populated urban area extends for a substantial distance in all directions beyond the heavy-lined city boundaries shown on a map issued by the State Department." He cited the Yenbien rail yard, which on the map seems far out in the country, but actually —as U.S. reconnaissance photographs must have shown— is in an area built up all the way from the city center to beyond the rail yard. Other targets were likewise in populated areas. "It is unlikely," Salisbury concluded, "that any bombing attack on such targets could be carried out without civilian damage and casualties."

Salisbury saw the damage and received on-the-spot reports of the casualties. Particularly impressive was his account, on December 27, of the repeated bombing of Namdinh, a textile center 50 miles south of Hanoi. Namdinh has been systematically attacked since June 28, 1965, by U.S. Seventh Fleet aircraft. "The cathedral tower," Salisbury writes, "looks out on block after block of utter desolation: the city's population of 90,000 has been reduced to less than 20,000 because of evacuation; 13 per cent of the city's houses, including the homes of 12,464 people, have been destroyed; eighty-nine people have been killed and 405 wounded."

Our forces obligingly bombed Hanoi while Salisbury was there. Has there ever been a parallel situation in a modern war? A prominent newsman from one of the belligerents visits the enemy capital, with the permission of both governments. He cables back reports damaging to his own government. His dispatches are printed and widely quoted. The war goes on, but on this one issue the two governments have in effect selected a reliable arbitrator.

Optimism on a resolution of the larger issues of the

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war would be premature, but the Salisbury mission lends some credence to John M. Hightower's article in the Sunday Washington *Star* (December 25) remarking on a show of candor by both sides in the matter of the December 13-14 bombings. The State Department is said to be seeking "some basis of mutual credibility," so that the U.S. and North Vietnamese Governments can begin an exchange of views. Hightower thinks the war may be scaled down or even ended in 1967. Salisbury's mission just might be the gleam of light at the end of the tunnel.

The Arms Spiral

In this issue (p. 46) George C. Wilson, Pentagon reporter for *The Washington Post*, traces the geometry of the new situation—technological, geopolitical, political—that may well give another dangerous twist to the arms spiral. Some cold comfort may be found in the circumstance that the anti-ballistic-missile argument will not be resolved immediately; there is still time for those who oppose the program to make themselves heard. Secretary Rusk reports that every effort is being made to work out some kind of agreement with the Russians that would avert this next, clearly foreseeable, acceleration of the arms race. Llewellyn Thompson is scheduled to resume his old post in Moscow later this month, and no doubt he has been instructed to give priority to the possibility of an agreement not to deploy anti-missile systems. Then, too, the seventeen-nation disarmament conference, slated to reconvene on February 21, will be used by other nations to press for some kind of agreement between the two major powers. Additional slight comfort may be found in the fact that the Nike X missile system is technically suspect and, on the face of it, would be worthless without a complementary shelter program, for which the public has shown a consistent aversion. The anti-missile system, plus the shelters, would be fantastically expensive. It is hard to believe that the cost of this program would be superimposed on the exploding costs of the Vietnamese War but it is by no means unthinkable.

The New York Times (December 25) reports that "American capitalists are extremely intrigued" by the Nike X project, which promises "tremendous profits" for some 3,000 companies directly involved—not to mention those that would be the beneficiaries of a shelter program. In purely political terms, also, the prospects for the program's adoption are not unfavorable. Rep. Gerald Ford has predicted that the Republicans will support the program and, if they do, Johnson will probably follow their lead, or in any case not oppose them. As in all such debates, the factor of secrecy will favor the Pentagon. The intelligence reports on which the military will rely will not be available to press or public. In retrospect, it is conceded that the "missile gap" which the Democrats exploited in 1960 did not exist. The fact that a serious division of opinion is said to exist within the Administration over the extent to which the Soviets have actually deployed an anti-missile system suggests the need for extreme caution and skepticism in assessing reports of this latest security "gap" which, as with the earlier one, is being ballyhooed just as the stage is being set for a Presidential election.

Certainly the public would be well advised to demand

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The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Magazine Company and copyright 1967 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10014. Tel.: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing office.

Subscription Price: One year, $10; two years, $18. Foreign and Canadian postage: $1 extra per year.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Information to Libraries: **The Nation** is indexed in Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION

Vol. 204
No. 2

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that the intelligence reports, and the feasability studies, on which the program is based, should be examined by a national commission made up of individuals not known as hawks or doves but for their honesty, intelligence and candor. The report of such a commission might help dissuade the Republicans from exploiting a security "gap" which may not exist, and just might encourage the Administration to resist the anti-missile stampede that is shaping up. Few issues on the agenda of the new Congress warrant closer public attention than this one.

Fragile Shelter

Another reason for approaching the anti-missile lap of the arms race with some caution is that—however certain the commercial profits implicit in the system—its ability to throw up a really effective protecting umbrella is a matter of divided opinion. Even within the industry there are not a few skeptics and doubters. One who warns of possible difficulties is Karl Sittel of the Radio Corporation of America. More than a year ago Dr. Sittel wrote a paper on "Effects on Radar of Plasma Produced by High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation." The paper is published currently by the RCA Missile and Surface Radar Division, with the reservation that the effects are discussed only "to the extent allowed by security regulations in an unclassified paper."

At the heart of an ABM system are specialized types of high-speed radar which, in combination with high-speed computers, will (it is hoped) guide rapid-acceleration defensive missiles to the vicinity of incoming ICBMs and deflect or destroy them. Thus, if the radar installations can be thrown into confusion, the entire ABM system, however ingeniously constructed and otherwise effective, becomes useless. It can neither deflect the enemy's missiles nor guide its own.

In simplest terms, radar works by sending out electromagnetic pulses which are then reflected from an object (ship, aircraft, missile, etc.) and come back with an indication of the nature of the object, its course and speed. With this information, the position of the object at a future instant can be calculated for interception. Perturbations in the intervening medium may block or distort the radar return. The medium in the case of an anti-ICBM radar is the ionosphere—the region above the dense portion of the earth's atmosphere. Like 95 per cent of the universe, it is composed of plasma (no connection with blood plasma), which is gas in a state of thermal and electrical excitation. What Sittel investigates, mathematically and physically, are the disturbances in the ionospheric plasma caused by an atomic explosion.

These phenomena are not new. Experiments with high-altitude nuclear explosions made in 1958 showed pronounced effects on radio communication, on a global scale. Sittel evaluates these effects on radar, and his findings have obvious reference to radars associated with ABM systems. "Contrary to a nuclear detonation at or near the ground," he points out, "the tremendous energies released from a single high-altitude nuclear detonation are almost entirely transferred into the ionization of the atmosphere." Electro-magnetic waves encountering the plasmas thus generated are subject to absorption, reflection, refraction, diffraction, scattering and other changes. One of the plasmas, the fireball, "will black out radar frequencies for many minutes," and this is only an example of the deleterious effects produced. "The degradation of radar systems by the combination of all the phenomena . . ." Sittel concludes, "must be seriously considered in all future designs of military systems."

What this means is that a few nuclear-tipped enemy missiles, launched and sequenced as outrunners, can probably paralyze the radars long enough to disable the ABM systems. Picked up on early-warning radars before they explode, these missiles will give notice to the controllers that a salvo of ICBMs will probably follow and can proceed unimpeded to their targets. The controllers will have no choice but to launch their retaliatory ICBMs, likewise with the first ones set to explode where they can disable the enemy ABM systems. Mutual neutralization of ABMs will be the end result of the expenditure of all those billions of dollars and rubles. The risk of an accidental nuclear showdown will be substantially increased. If, as is conceivable, the early warning radars have given a false indication, but the ICBMs have already been loosed, it will be just too bad. Also for Wall Street.

After Apollo, Why?

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration was supposed to report to a Congressional committee by December 1 on its plans for the years following completion of the Project Apollo series, but the deadline passed and no report was issued. Instead, the agency sent a long letter to the President which, with his penchant for secrecy, he has not released.

Not that NASA didn't have any plans in mind; its ambitions are as boundless as outer space. Suggested projects include the development of a re-usable booster rocket, colonizing the moon, putting a manned research laboratory in orbit, and, looking ahead, an expedition to Mars—which Dr. Jerome Wiesner once estimated might take thirty to thirty-five years and cost $100 billion. This year NASA is spending a modest $5.4 billion, which the President—who has always dealt generously with the agency in the past—felt compelled to cut back by a few million because of the high costs of killing in Vietnam (the current estimate is that it now costs $322,000 to kill a single enemy soldier in combat). So in fiscal 1968, NASA may have to make do with $5 billion or thereabouts. But the empire builders of the agency are intrepid and resourceful, and NASA's "growth" prospects are excellent. For one thing, it has a huge organization (some 400,000 people are directly involved in space programs) and is supported by a potent lobby, the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. Then, too, NASA has built up a vast popular constituency through its brilliantly staged television space spectaculars.

The new governmental-industrial hybrids, of which NASA is an outstanding example, are inherently difficult to curb; power is built into the structure of the organization itself. No agency of government, Executive or legislative, knows enough about NASA to control or direct it. In any argument over funds, NASA can always say that without new projects the organization will disintegrate. In

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terms of pressing social needs, it is easy to agree with William Hines of the Washington *Star* who says that the proper question should be not "After Apollo, What?" but "After Apollo, Why?" This is, indeed, the right question, but it is too late to raise it. Ours is not to reason why but to appropriate more and more. And behind the real question is the real problem: can the government regulate and control, much less direct, such formidable fusions of government and private power as NASA represents?

No doubt NASA has stimulated American technology and science and it may be assumed that its performance has been first rate. But the problem remains, can NASA be regulated? Can its inexhaustible appetite for power and projects be subjected to any kind of democratic discipline? Who is to determine the magnitude of space appropriations? By what standards and in terms of what priorities? NASA is in orbit—that's the real problem. It circles the governmental universe and from time to time sends back cryptic messages, but it no longer belongs (if it ever did) to the people whose taxes support it.

The 'P.C.' Gimmick

"P.C." is financial jargon for "participating certificate," a hybrid type of government security issued in the past by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fanny May"). These securities, which have never come to the attention of the ordinary citizen, are now revealed as a possible means of fiscal legerdemain in the presentation of the federal budget. By substituting P.C.s for conventional treasury obligations, the President could make the budget for fiscal year 1968 look pretty good, when in reality it is badly out of balance. Whether such deception is actually perpetrated, and, if so, whether Congress will go along, remains to be seen.

In the past, Fanny May has floated P.C.s in a ring-around-the-rosy game of mortgage financing in which the federal government and private lending agencies are the players. Almost all small home purchases in the United States are financed with a small down payment and a lifetime of monthly payments on a mortgage. The lender sells the mortgage to Fanny May—often with a prior commitment by the latter to buy—thus getting his money back for further lending. Fanny May gets *its* money back by the sale of P.C.s which are guaranteed, like government bonds, by "the full faith and credit of the United States." Besides home loans, college housing and academic facilities, farm mortgages and small business loans are refinanced by P.C.s. In effect, the P.C. buyer gets a share in a pool of miscellaneous loans made in the past by the United States Government.

When P.C.s are offered in the open market, they compete with other certificates of debt and affect interest rates and salability of corporate bonds. Since the bond market was in poor shape in 1966, President Johnson announced, in September, that further sales of P.C.s would be postponed until the bond market improved. The gimmick consists not in such sales but in the proposed "sale" of P.C.s to government trust funds, such as social security, which hold about $45 billion in treasury obligations.

By exchanging P.C.s for these securities, which figure in the national debt and hence in the budget deficit, the latter can be lowered by the amount of the exchange. The bond market is not affected: all that has happened is that the trust funds now hold P.C.s in their portfolios, and a like amount in treasury debt is canceled.

Congress must approve P.C. sales, both in the open market and to the trust funds, but there is nothing to prevent the President from putting into the budget proposed P.C. sales to the funds and thus reducing the deficit, which in fiscal 1968 will exceed $10 billion. The Johnson Administration is currently selling $1.1 billion in P.C.s, $600 million to "the public" (mainly banks and large investors) and $500 million to the government trust funds. The latter "sale" may be a trial balloon for furthering substitution of P.C.s for treasury obligations. By judicious application of the P.C. technique the President may be able to dodge an otherwise unavoidable tax hike.

From the standpoint of fiscal responsibility all such maneuvers are to be discouraged, and the more so when the cause of the deficit is the Vietnamese War. The Johnson Administration has succeeded in hiding the true monetary cost of the war from the public by various evasions. The 90th Congress should be on the lookout for this latest artistry in fiscal image improvement. When the Participation Sales Act was rushed through Congress at the President's insistence, we tagged it as a "nifty gimmick" and said of it: "the deficit will appear to be reduced, private investors will be cut in on a nice security market, and an additional burden will be placed on the taxpayer for the sake of improving the President's 'image'" ("Another Johnson Gimmick," *The Nation*, May 23, 1966). The latest developments amply confirm this judgment.

The Nation Will Miss

Irita Van Doren was an essentially simple woman who loved good books. She became quite naturally a halcyon editor. She had a quick brown eye and she smiled often, delightfully. She sat at her desk, quietly and thoughtfully editing book reviews, during tumultuous decades. For thirty-seven years, from 1926 to 1963, she was editor of "Books," the New York *Herald Tribune*'s weekly review which, for those years, was the most interesting and influential of the newspaper literary supplements. Irita Van Doren went to the *Herald Tribune* from *The Nation*. She joined the editorial staff here in 1919 and became literary editor in 1923. She had a sense of newness in life which she imparted to "Books," issue by issue, and her forte was friendship. As editor and friend, her influence on American writing and American writers, particularly in the late 1920s and 1930s, was substantial.

From January, 1930, to July, 1955, Gladys Whiteside was copy editor of *The Nation*. Copy editors are seldom well known to contributors or readers but are often legendary figures to the staff. Mrs. Whiteside's name will evoke a flood of recollections and stories from all those who knew her during the many years she subjected *Nation* prose to her severe Wellesley standards. She was a no-nonsense copy editor who admired clarity and precision and detested frills. From the cubbyhole of an office that she occupied for many years she exuded a frosty austerity that seemed to say, "Don't bother me with any of your

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silly questions." But she was for all that a thoughtful, kindly person and a fine working colleague. Like many persons who have served on the staff of *The Nation*, she was, by comparison with the paper's editorial position, a staunch conservative who regularly attended the meetings of the descendants of the original Newport patentees and consistently favored sending in the Fleet, if not the Marines, to cope with any untoward disturbances abroad. At the same time, she reveled in the fact that her association with *The Nation* was a source of deep concern to her upstate Republican relatives. She is remembered in this office with gratitude and affection.

RISE OF THE CIA

How Foggy Bottom Lost Its Spies

SMITH SIMPSON

Mr. Simpson has occupied many foreign posts for the U.S. State Department and has been active at home in labor affairs. He was associated with the development of the United Nations Charter, has served as Labor Attaché in Brussels, as First Secretary in Athens and Mexico City, as Deputy Principal Officer at the Consulate General in Bombay, and as Consul General in Mozambique. In 1958, Mr. Simpson became adviser on African affairs to the Department of Labor and was Director of the Office of Country Programs in that department. He returned to the State Department, resigned in 1962, but returned as a consultant in 1965.

The article here published will appear as a chapter in Mr. Simpson's Anatomy of the State Department, *to be published by Houghton Mifflin in March.*

The relations of the State Department with the Central Intelligence Agency are of the most critical sort. They influence the Department's effectiveness, our government's overall management of foreign affairs, and the moral and political principles which we claim to stand for at home and abroad. They are thus crucial to all phases of the leadership we try to exercise in world affairs.

Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA, provides that the agency "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities." This is a clear statement—as long as one knows what "intelligence" is.

"Intelligence" is simply *evaluated information.* If we know that a man has landed on the coast of Cuba with a handful of guerrillas and begun hostile operations against the Cuban Government, we have information. Intelligence, on the other hand, tells us who he and his associates are, in terms of background, psychological make-up and political philosophy; what their objectives and chances of success are, and what the results of their success or failure may be.

The CIA is not alone in gathering information pertinent to national defense and converting it into intelligence. It was not intended by the National Security Act to monopolize these functions, nor has it attempted to do so. It specializes in collecting information by surreptitious means, acting as a clearinghouse for all intelligence, and assisting the other members of the intelligence community (primarily State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI) with some of their special assignments.

Governments—our own included—have from time immemorial engaged in spying. Wherever we have been faced with a serious problem of gaining or preserving our independence we have resorted to espionage and much that goes with it, including the bribery of foreign officials. We have not liked it. It has always been repugnant to us. But we, like everyone else, have had to yield to the dictates of necessity.

It was our good fortune for many years to have little or no need of espionage in our overseas diplomacy. We used it against the Indians at home, for this was a matter of survival, but once our independence was assured we could give it up in overseas dealings, and it is to our credit that we did so. However, our moral compunctions made it hard even for seasoned diplomats to learn the facts about our changing position as we moved into international politics, and World War I found us at a considerable disadvantage.

A perfect illustration of our dilemma began to unfold in 1913 when Herbert O. Yardley joined the State Department as a young code clerk. Imaginative, questioning, ingenious, he began to suspect that the department's code system was unsafe against the intelligence activities of other governments. To test the soundness of his suspicions he applied himself to breaking all the department's codes without reference to any key. He succeeded. He could not get his point across to the diplomats, however, and, finally discouraged, approached the military intelligence division of the War Department with a proposal to develop a cryptographic unit for breaking codes and devising safe ones.

The War Department took Yardley on, and, while his discouragement by no means ended, he was eventually authorized to organize MI-8, the Intelligence Corps' first unit, to invent new military codes and crack those of other governments. The value of his work became apparent when Yardley deciphered a long message of the German Government offering a generous reward to Mexico for remaining neutral in World War I.

After the re-establishment of peace, the War Department and State arranged to support a group of skilled cryptographers with Yardley at its head. Although he knew not a word of the language, Yardley was able to crack the Japanese code during preparations for the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference. The United States Government therefore knew precisely what the various fallback positions of the Japanese delegation were to be, and bargained accordingly. The diplomatic advantage of such feats was immeasurable, for we had little preparation to buttress our ambition to exercise some influence in post-

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war international affairs. By 1929, Yardley and the little group which he had trained had broken the codes of some twenty countries, including those of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Japan. They thereby kept State posted on transactions and decisions of foreign governments as no diplomatic officers could possibly have done.

The climax to this revealing piece of history came in 1929, when Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of State. Stimson was a man seasoned in public and military affairs, but peacetime intelligence was something else. A few days after taking charge of State, he found on his desk several deciphered messages of a diplomatic mission in Washington. Demanding to know where and how such materials had originated, he was apprised of Yardley's operation. Stimson ordered immediate cessation of State's support. "Gentlemen," he as much as said, "do not read each other's mail."

The difficulty was, not everybody engaging in international affairs was a gentleman. There were those who did read others' mail and based their diplomatic moves accordingly. Naive though he was in this matter, Stimson had his way. With funds cut off, Yardley had to disband his staff. But before retiring to write a bitter, fascinating book on his disillusioning experience, he spoke his mind. In a final interview with a State Department official, he repeated that every one of the department's codes could be, and probably had been, broken by foreign governments, just as he had broken theirs. "Our codes," he said bluntly, "are just as cumbersome, just as antiquated as 16th-century communications."

The department's cabled messages to its posts abroad and theirs to it were as tight as sieves. The uneasy official asked what could be done. Yardley pointed out that machines on the market could be adapted to eliminate all possibilities of cracking. The ominous warning was as clear as a bell—and the solution too—but nothing was done about it.

The department—and the government—were to pay heavily. As World War II approached, our efforts to meet its challenges engaged us in all sorts of activity designed not only to assure supplies of strategic materials—rubber, tin, oil and the like—but to stockpile these against the possibility of war. When war came, we used our period of neutrality to sap the power of governments clearly hostile to us by bidding against them for these materials and wangling higher priority for our orders than we were entitled to. It was no time to be squeamish. We matched chicanery with chicanery. This was done through a specially created agency.

The greater such activities became, the greater became our need of information—a more systematic, thorough collection, a more rapid collection, a more accurate evaluation, a more effective distribution to all departments and agencies concerned with our growing effort of survival. The interest and initiative of State in all this were far below requirements, and it was from outside the diplomatic establishment that the urgency of the task was brought to the President's attention. Aware of the deficiencies of State and the military, and realizing the imperative need for a larger, more professional, less orthodox effort, a New York lawyer and Republican leader with military experience went to Washington in 1940 and laid the problem squarely before the White House. Col. William J. Donovan soon found himself on a rapid investigation trip to Europe at the end of which he was made head of an Office of the Coordinator of Information, directly responsible to the President. Later, when this organization was split into the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, Donovan, heading the latter, was still answerable only to the White House. State was by-passed.

At the same time that Donovan and Roosevelt discussed the critical need for more and prompter information, they reviewed another of Donovan's ideas—the combining of intelligence with support of resistance movements and (if we should become involved in war, as then seemed probable) the harassment of the enemy by guerrilla forces. When war came and the Office of Strategic Services crystallized out of the OCI, this dangerous, semi-military operation was rapidly set in motion.

We must pass over the colorful history of OSS but we should have clearly in mind what it was designed to do, for it led directly to the Central Intelligence Agency. It had five functions: (1) to gather information all over the world by any and all means, open and clandestine, including underground activities in harassment of the enemy; (2)



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to process all this information, turning it into intelligence; (3) to pass this intelligence on to interested components of the government; (4) to receive, process and distribute intelligence from other government agencies and from foreign governments; (5) to wound the enemy by all possible means short of conventional military operations.

Hastily improvised, the OSS made its share of mistakes. Considering the difficulties, however, Donovan and his associates did an extraordinary job. A factor essential for their success was their insistence upon the meticulous training of their operators. They were able to provide this training because of an arrangement with the military establishment. State could have done this, too, in order better to qualify its own people. But this never occurred to State. Nor has it occurred since.

Like the military, OSS was an action agency. The mass of information it assembled was designed to achieve specific results. Research and investigation were directly related to those results. In other words, the operators carried out what the researchers, strategists and tacticians had decided could and should be done, taking into account the known circumstances.

When World War II came to an end, the need for centralizing so fundamental an activity as intelligence was widely recognized, and a move was made to give the responsibility to State. The Bureau of the Budget so recommended and President Truman, in abolishing the OSS in the fall of 1945, transferred its saboteurs to the military establishment and its experienced intelligence analysts to the diplomatic, notifying the Secretary of State:

> I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department.

The President, like the Budget Bureau, overestimated the capacity of State. Had it been simply a matter of creating "an interdepartmental group," State might have muddled through. But the problem was more than organizational and certainly involved more than adding another interagency committee to the federal apparatus.

State went through the motions of carrying out the President's directive. A special assistant to the Secretary was appointed to deal with research and intelligence. An interdepartmental group was created, as directed. Space was found for some 1,600 persons, including a large number of former OSS staffers. Then the effort tapered off. State could not muster the imagination to use its new resources properly. It could not even provide a hospitable environment. Its diplomatic officers were not about to surrender their old status. They wanted their old center of power to continue in the geographic bureaus. The old fraternity sensibilities came into play. The old resistance to new ideas. The old smugness.

One by one OSS staff members dropped away. Dissatisfaction spread in the government's intelligence community. The President stepped in, reversed his earlier order and established an Intelligence Authority independent of State. The operating arm of this authority was a newly formed Central Intelligence Group which a year later became the Central Intelligence Agency, under a director subject to the supervision of the National Security Council. State's removal from the centralizing and coordinating role was thus effected.

So CIA at its birth was something more than a rival of State. It was more than another agency with an "itch to get into the act." It was an agency whose very existence attested to the incompetence of the diplomatic establishment.

CIA now got its own intelligence gatherers—i.e., spies—into each of our missions abroad. They worked independently of the rest of the mission staff. They reported to their headquarters in Washington in their own code, as a foreign government would do. They played their cards close to their vests. Their diplomatic colleagues in the missions to which they were attached rarely knew what information they were ferreting out. Even the ambassador seldom knew—he who was supposed to be in charge of and responsible for a mission's entire activities. CIA was in many ways a secret intelligence operation even with respect to its own government.

These factors introduced a serious psychological problem. They meant that every piece of information CIA got and State didn't was a reflection upon State, a reflection on the effectiveness of its diplomatic officers and their awareness of what was going on. It was a CIA "scoop" and it rankled. It made the diplomats want to downgrade or ignore some of CIA's more alarming news, particularly if it did not corroborate their own. This made difficult not only State-CIA relations but the whole process of putting information and intelligence to accurate and constructive use. The kind of tightly knit intelligence operation needed for our success just was not there. Nor is it today.

It would have done no good to have reminded State that the independence of CIA was due to its own failure. But it might have done some good if State had recognized that there was not only an organizational but a psychological problem in all this: since State had made life miserable for the intelligence officers inherited from OSS, the latter, when transferred to CIA and released from their humiliations in State, rejoiced in the opportunity of thumbing their noses at their erstwhile colleagues. For if State had only seen this aspect of the problem, it could have moved to train its officers to cope with it; once involved with training of that limited sort, it quite possibly might have gone on to deal with other factors, such as its own careless security arrangements, which also were properly viewed with concern by the CIA. But at no point did all this dawn on State.

We come now to a most sensitive item, one that accounts for great, and often serious confusion in our foreign affairs. The National Security Act, in addition to delegating the intelligence function to CIA, authorized it "to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be most efficiently accomplished centrally." This, if language means anything, authorized CIA to engage in intelligence activities additional to those spelled out in the act—the additional activities to be for the benefit of "the existing intelligence agencies." But the act did not mean that, and wasn't intended to. What the language was intended to cover up was the kind of subversive activity, promotion of guerrilla

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warfare and the like, which OSS had engaged in and which the National Security Council might decide in a particular situation was necessary for the defense of our interests.

To conduct its "special operations," CIA set up a Plans Division and hired Allen Dulles, a former OSS operator, to be its first director. This was done under President Truman—an interesting point, as we shall see. With the imaginativeness and boldness demonstrated in their earlier OSS operations, Dulles and his associates were off to new ventures, and it became clear that some stronger control was needed than that supplied by the National Security Council, whose members met infrequently and hurriedly and dispersed to pressing duties in their respective departments. A "Special Group" evolved, consisting of the Director of the CIA, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and representatives of the military establishment. The group came late on the scene. It grew out of an OCB (Operations Coordinating Board) "luncheon group," which itself came some time after CIA had got a head start on its secret operations, and thus it inherited a somewhat casual character.

Meeting about once a week, the group carries on its discussions informally, a fact which is an asset to CIA's secrecy, since it enables the agency not only to control the agenda but also to steer discussion away from matters it prefers the others not to know about. And since CIA's representative presides over the group, it can seize the initiative at the outset of a meeting and consume the entire session with a prickly question unrelated to more dubious activities. Moreover, the CIA representative is a Presidential appointee. The State Department member has found it hard to probe deeply, much less to steer or contest, the work of a Presidential appointee directing an autonomous agency. He just doesn't have that status. Moreover (and here we touch a vital point), he is generally a rotated officer. He cannot match the inside knowledge, the political prestige and the weight of continuous experience which the CIA director can muster. Because of the failure of State to dominate the group, the theory that the latter should inform all interested establishments of what CIA is doing, and that all CIA activities should be carried on within the framework of foreign policies set by State, does not work out in practice. State is kept in the dark about many CIA operations abroad and especially about those which run counter to the department's policies.

Somewhere along the line, State should have seen the handwriting on the wall, so visible to others, and moved to train its own officers to lead and control in this area. It should have strengthened the Operations Coordinating Board, which held some promise of developing federal plans and disciplines. But in its fluctuating, fragmentary way, with personnel in today and gone tomorrow, it only grumbled about CIA. Its rotating officers never took time to ask themselves what the agency operations portended for State and the government; never studied the functions and training methods of the agency; never sought to bring the training of its own officers up to a level competitive with CIA, so as to reduce the need of the agency's unorthodox activities; never asked itself what the significance of the OCB was in this connection.

Living with CIA has thus become more and more difficult. The agency supported Indonesian rebels against Sukarno while State was trying to work with Sukarno. It supplied and emboldened the anti-Communist Chinese guerrillas in Burma over the protests of the Burmese Government and the repeated protestations of the State Department in Washington and our ambassador in Burma that we were doing no such thing. In Vietnam, too, CIA and State have worked at cross-purposes.

But the agency has not confined its activities to unstable countries. It has meddled elsewhere, to the consternation of the State Department and friendly governments. In the mid-1950s, its agents intruded awkwardly in Costa Rica, the most stable and democratic country in Latin America. While the agency was trying to oust José Figueres, the moderate Socialist who became the Costa Rican President in a fair election in 1953, the State Department was working with him, and our ambassador was urging President Eisenhower to invite him to the United States to enhance his prestige. So it went the world around.

It was the CIA that negotiated with the Guatemalan Government for the right and facilities to train Cuban refugees to invade their country. It paid the refugees, trained them, arranged for their transportation to the Bay of Pigs, where they sought to overthrow the Castro regime by force of arms supplied by CIA. It was the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which assured two Presidents that the venture was feasible. The State Department hardly knew what was going on. It could not seriously analyze or contest the project.

As part of its "special operations," CIA has done everything from peaceful frustration of Communists to peaceful frustration of the State Department; from deciding whom we would back among various possibilities in a given country to undercutting people the State Department backs, and on to fomenting and conducting undeclared wars. Little by little it has moved into an area of decision and action reserved by the Constitution for the President alone, spreading contradictions and confusion in our foreign policies along the way.

It has been enough to awe ex-President Truman, who soon began to have the gravest misgivings about the agency he had created. He wrote in a syndicated newspaper article in late 1953:

> With all the nonsense put out by Communist propaganda . . . in their name-calling assault on the West, the last thing we needed was for the CIA to be seized upon as something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of other people. . . .
>
> There are now some searching questions that need to be answered. I . . . would like to see the CIA restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President, and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field—and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.
>
> We have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position and I feel that we need to correct it.

It may be that Mr. Truman as President was not fully aware, when he signed the order establishing the CIA, that he was subscribing to language which carried CIA beyond the intelligence area. He may not have been aware that

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a Plans Division, to conduct CIA's special operations, was established in 1951 under his Presidency. He may not have known that Allen Dulles came to Washington to be the first director of that division during his own occupancy of the White House. Presidents are busy officials. They cannot keep up with everything. They must go a good deal on what their associates tell, or don't tell, them. But by the close of 1953, Mr. Truman was alarmed by the magnitude of CIA operations and by the basic issues these operations were presenting not only to our federal government and to friendly foreign governments but to the form of our society. This was also enough to worry the State Department and many a thoughtful citizen.

"Today," Allen Dulles has observed, "the Soviet State Security Service (KOB) is the eyes and ears of the Soviet state abroad, as well as at home. It is a multi-purpose, clandestine arm of power that can in the last analysis carry out almost any act that the Soviet leadership assigns to it. It is more than a secret police organization, more than an intelligence and counter-intelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries. It is an aggressive arm of Soviet ambitions in the cold war." The CIA may not be a secret police organization but in every other respect it meets Mr. Dulles' description of the KOB. Through its independent agents, who are on the staffs of every one of our diplomatic missions and who report and act secretly, without informing the rest of the mission, including the ambassador, it provides our government with eyes and ears abroad. It is also an arm of our government, a multi-purpose, clandestine arm of power. It is more than an intelligence organization. It is an instrument for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries, even to the point of waging undeclared war. It can be an aggressive arm. It is an untamed arm. Not only does it challenge the political principles and philosophy on which our government was founded: it challenges the clear language of the Constitution itself.

It has been pointed out that the State Department works very much on its own, regardless of who is Secretary of State or President. The CIA is also on its own, only very much more so. While State has secrets, it nevertheless operates as an open rather than a clandestine organization. It is not required, as are other departments and agencies of the government, to submit an annual report to Congress, but it must submit annually a request for appropriations and answer questions about its request in public sessions of Congressional subcommittees. Its representatives must testify frequently before a variety of Congressional committees, hold press conferences, make speeches explaining what the department is doing, and generally preserve an open, aboveboard operation.

None of this is true of CIA. Its budget is buried in the Defense Department budget. No one save a few CIA officials and the Comptroller of the Pentagon knows where it is hidden and how much it amounts to. No one even knows how large a staff CIA has. No one knows CIA's methods of personnel operations, so that, as Congressmen have often observed, no one really knows "whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one." And Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) has commented: "Secrecy beclouds everything about the CIA—its cost, its efficiency, its successes and its failures." CIA has so far evaded any close checking by Congress. The Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both houses do have subcommittees on the CIA but, like the Executive "watchdog" apparatus, they never get below the surface of CIA affairs.

In this crucial area, the State Department cannot meet the situation with its present attitudes of mind, its present operating procedures, and its present inadequate training of officers. Its deficiencies oblige State to deal with CIA as though it were a foreign government, able to extract from it only as much information concerning its activities and only as much compliance with our general policy lines as CIA is willing, gratuitously, to grant—and it is not willing to grant enough. This is an impossible situation. But it will not be rectified until State places itself in a position to operate effectively and command respect because of its greater competence.

AMERICAN CATHOLICISM

THE WIND FROM ROME

GARY MacEOIN

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Most American Protestants do not think that the second Vatican Council has brought any significant change in Catholic attitudes toward them. "No noticeable gain in friendliness," say 54 per cent of respondents to a recent survey by the *Christian Herald,* largest interdenominational Protestant magazine; and *Herald* readers would be more likely than the average Protestant to find themselves in ecumenical contexts.

To conclude that nothing has changed would be wrong. My long-time friend, Paul Blanshard, whose vitriolic attacks on the Catholic Church caused the New York City Board of School Superintendents to exclude *The Nation* from public school libraries in 1948, a ban rescinded only in 1963, now writes for the *Catholic World.* The Church has produced in the United States during the Council years "a vital Catholic liberalism," he says. "It is clear that Catholicism is no longer intellectually monolithic."

Not everyone would concede that Catholicism was intellectually monolithic before the Council, but it unquestionably created that impression. There is, moreover, a good reason why few Protestants (or others, with or without a capital C) are conscious of a change. The impact

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so far has been mainly internal. Initiative has come from the ranks rather than the leaders, and juridic institutional forms have scarce begun to reflect the profound evolution of attitudes and practices in the past five years. But change is surfacing rapidly. The space given to Catholic "novelties" by *Life*, *Look*, *Saturday Evening Post* and the rest of the mass media demonstrates that fact.

The climate was long sociologically ripe for a move. Emotionally adult Catholics resented the paternalism of bishops and pastors. Economically independent Catholics were revolted equally by the efforts to maintain a separate subculture on the one hand, and to prove super-patriotism and jingoistic Americanism on the other. Intellectuals rejected theological simplism and obscurantism. It was the

Council, however, which precipitated and facilitated the catalysis.

A basic postulate of American life is that leaders do not lead, with rare exceptions like Lincoln and Kennedy (and see what happened to *them*). They seek a consensus. They follow public opinion. That has certainly been true of the country's 250 Catholic bishops at this juncture. They approached the Council in October, 1962, without a program for updating the Church. As Xavier Rynne pointed out in his first reports from Rome, their education had made most of them creatures of the Roman Curia, had conditioned them to approve uncritically its myopic proposals. They had no suspicion that significant change was just over the horizon. That vision came from Europe (Suenens, Alfrink, for example), from Africa (Rugambwa, Blomjous), from Asia (Maximos IV Saigh, Hakim), from Latin America (Helder Camara, Méndez Arceo).

A relatively small number of North Americans were willing to identify with progress, men like Meyer, Ritter, Hallinan, Primeau and Wright. Some were eclectics, the outstanding example being Cardinal Cushing of Boston, whose pastoral letter of April, 1963, on public opinion in the Church is revolutionary by contrast with the me-tooisms and platitudes of his colleagues. A few were reactionaries like McIntyre or obscurantists like Spellman. But most simply fence-straddled, abdicating their leadership. They still maintain that stance, because there is no consensus today among American Catholics on issues on which the bishops should give them moral leadership, like integrated housing and the napalming of Vietnam.

The leadership has been and is elsewhere. Without discounting the important preparatory work performed in the pre-conciliar darkness by the courageous editors of *Commonweal*, *America*, *Sign*, *Jubilee* and *Ave Maria*, I think the first generals to catch the imagination of the intellectuals and form determined currents of opinion were some young and not so young theologians: Courtney Murray, Gustave Weigel, Bernard Cooke, Gerard Sloyan, Godfrey Diekmann, John L. McKenzie, ably abetted by Gregory Baum from Toronto and such visiting European giants as Hans Küng and Barnard Häring. The quarterly *Cross Currents* played a valuable role by making the European thinking which dominated the Council available to the intellectuals. It helped to rally to the standards of the theologians I have just mentioned many of the younger clergy, a majority of seminarians, and what I suspect is still a rather small, though vocal and vitally important, minority of the more than 180,000 nuns who form the biggest and in many ways the most critical element in the Catholic Church as an institution in the United States. John Cogley, Michael Novak, Dan Callaghan and other lay intellectuals became involved, though the number was never as big as the noise sometimes suggested.

The most obvious change, a previously unknown freedom of expression, is also a crucial one. This is something that the entire American public can see because today Catholics are shooting off their mouths not only in their own theological and intellectual publications, not only in the popular Catholic press, but in other denominational magazines like the *Christian Century* and *Christian Herald*, and in the national media, both specialized and mass.

The discussion ranges and rages over practically the entire spectrum of previous taboos. I can think of only one significant exception. There is still (apart from gentle wrist-slapping by *Commonweal* and the *National Catholic Reporter*) practically no objective evaluation of the actions of the Pope, little attempt to assess his views on *aggiornamento*. Although this is an issue of urgent ecumenical importance, the cult of personality is still so strong that Catholic public opinion resents any discussion, condemns even generic references as unacceptable impertinence.

But just about everything else is wheeled to the dissecting table; birth control, celibacy of the clergy, the machinations of the Curia (including the role of the Apostolic delegate in Washington), Church finances, Church-controlled education. And this injection of public opinion into the total life of the Church has produced irreversible changes. The birth-control debate, for example, regardless of what the

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outcome may be, has brought a re-evaluation of methods and assumptions in a score of areas, a fruitful questioning of the function of religion, the service its institutionalized forms should perform both for members and for society in general, its pertinence to contemporary society. Specialists in many ecclesiastical sciences have received new insights through being forced to recognize finally that the issue of birth control was not an artificial creation of enemies of the Catholic Church, as some simplistically believed, but a vital concern of the body of the faithful. Areas affected include the meaning and scope of papal infallibility, the development of doctrine, the understanding of marriage, of sex, and of the dignity of the human person.

Commonweal, established in 1924, had preceded the Council in a cautious opening up of issues scarcely whispered elsewhere. A weekly magazine of opinion, owned and operated by Catholic laymen, it then provided a safety valve for the liberal intellectuals to whom it spoke by circumspect, middle-of-the-road demurrers against a conservatism which arrogated to itself, and was generally accorded, the exclusive title to orthodoxy. It is far from my intention to criticize what *Commonweal* did. Survival in that climate required tact as well as courage, and *Commonweal* excelled in both qualities.

In the late 1950s, the Jesuit-owned *America* threatened to undercut it by appropriating its formula and applying it with vastly superior capital and manpower. More recently, however, *America* has backed off, today is floundering in attempts by a conservative editor to apply a liberal formula under the scrutiny of an institution dominated by reaction.

The monthly *Ramparts*, lay-owned and edited, started in 1962 with the avowed aim of putting everything under its microscope. Its vivisections have exposed some conditions requiring urgent surgery, but its efforts at creating new forms of life have generally ended as abortions or thalidomide births. Not so the weekly *National Catholic Reporter* (NCR), also independently owned and lay-edited, established in October, 1964, and reaching a popular public in popular language.

Superbly professional in its techniques, NCR has been daring without alienating any broad segment of Catholic public opinion. It broke the story that Apostolic Delegate Vagnozzi had informed the American bishops that "the Holy See" did not want them to implement the Council decree on ecumenism until Rome first spelled out the ground rules. *Time, Newsweek, The New York Times* and others took up the story, were unable to find in Rome any order to justify Vagnozzi's claim, left the public with the conviction that Vagnozzi and his reactionary friends in the Curia were the Holy See he had been brandishing.

NCR was also first to air clerical celibacy in a substantial way. It features the views of the most advanced Catholic theologians on the morality of contraceptive techniques, ran a series on intrauterine devices which drew many requests for reprints. A recent "scoop" was that Archbishop Karl Alter of Cincinnati, acting with Cardinal Antoniutti (head of the curial body which keeps nuns in their place), has cracked down on a group of nuns who work among the poor of the Appalachia for interpreting too literally the Vatican Council's call to nuns to get with the 20th century. They may not open new houses or accept members for a year, must be in bed by 10 P.M., must send no more members to study at a catechetical center run by Cardinal Suenens of Brussels.

Not a few bishops are outraged by the newsmen who observe the Vatican Council's admonition that their "special knowledge, competence or ability may sometimes oblige them to express their opinions on things which concern the good of the church." Bishop Bernard Topel of Spokane, Wash., has charged that some Catholic publications should not be found in Catholic homes; Archbishop Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Fla., that "a coterie of Catholic writers specialize in vilifying priests"; Cardinal Shehan of Baltimore, that almost wholesale negative criticism has been the stock in trade of some Catholic journalists; Archbishop John Krol of Philadelphia, that they are undermining the authority of the hierarchy.

Such bishops are fighting a lost battle. A recent poll of the editors of the 120 Catholic weeklies rated NCR second best (topped only by the *St. Louis Review*). As one editor said, "it is free of the institutionalism that plagues the Catholic press as a whole . . . uses its liberty constructively and aggressively." The existence of NCR, and the willingness of editors like Don Quinn of the *St. Louis Review* and John O'Connor of the *Delmarva Dialog* (Wilmington, Del.) to apply the same techniques make it progressively harder for bishops and religious superiors to get away with arbitrary abuses of authority. When, last April, the Philadelphia *Catholic Standard and Times* denounced as distorted the Philadelphia *Bulletin* story about criticisms of the seminary regime submitted to the archbishop by seminarians, without offering its readers the facts, O'Connor quickly remedied the deficiency in the *Dialog*. His authoritative summary of the document, in addition, vindicated the *Bulletin*.

Some of the mass monthlies, also institutionally owned, have moved vigorously into the Council spirit, led by *Ave Maria, Sign, U.S. Catholic* and *Extension*. The sixty-year-old *Extension* is remarkable. Formerly, it sold 400,000 copies monthly on the basis of a plaster-saint-with-electric-eyes piety, supported by advertising of remedies for baldness. Today it applies the same virtuosity and sophisticated techniques to moving its mass readership into the new swing. A few diocesan publications, led by the Brooklyn *Tablet*, as well as the lay-owned *Wanderer* (St. Paul, Minn.) and L. Brent Bozell's just started *Triumph*, fight a valiant rear-guard action for De Pauw and those who call themselves traditionalists. Many of the institutional monthlies and weeklies meanwhile continue to smoke their opium pipes and smother their readers in billowing clouds of non-thought.

If I have dealt at length on the press, it is because here one sees most clearly the ebb and flow of battle. Institutional changes are few and hesitant, though they must come. The National Conference of Bishops (NCWC) will soon be able to make decisions binding on its members. This will, of course, help; but it will not alter the fact that bishops are elderly men whose minds are set in rigid molds. The best intentioned find it hard to treat the faithful as

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

adults. Their attempts to implement the Council are top-heavy with bureaucracy, new words to the old music.

Nevertheless, they are trying. Many bishops have organized the council of priests ordered by the Council to permit methodic exchange of information and discussion of problems. A few are bringing laymen cautiously into the consultative and even the decision-making processes. More of this will come, and it will among other things serve an ecumenical function by narrowing the gap between Catholic and Protestant forms of Church organization in the country. But it will come sporadically and with major local variations. This should rejoice rather than disturb Protestants, for it will be living evidence that this is no monolith. The very variety of institutionalism spells the death of one of the divisive factors.

Initiative for institutional change is coming and will come from below more than from above, another reflection of the new dispersal of authority. Typical is the creation in September, 1966, of the Institute for Freedom in the Church by a group of laymen, priests and nuns, as a nonofficial organization to deal with problems of personal freedom within the institutional structures of the Church. Its founders have drafted a program similar to that of the Civil Liberties Union in the civil area. They propose to examine claims of violations of freedom in the Church and use available means to determine the facts and achieve justice. Also like the ACLU, they plan to review existing structures and work to eliminate features not consonant with contemporary concepts of human dignity and freedom.

Individual witness has also become an important instrument of change. Participation by priests and nuns in civil rights protests has become commonplace overnight, often without the consent and sometimes against the expressed opposition of their superiors. Jesuit Daniel Berrigan's reputation has risen because of his superiors' ineffectual attempts to silence his pacifist preachings. Father DuBay is to many a hero for denouncing Cardinal McIntyre's ignoring of the moral challenge of Watts. Seminarians have widely taken the initiative, as in Philadelphia, in developing freer regimes, more contact with contemporary thought, more association with the people they are preparing to serve. Both they and the younger priests have a new concept of law as an aid to ordered living, not as the chain of a slave gang. They shed their clerical garb when it becomes an embarrassment or a hindrance. They participate in worship with other Christians, in experimental ways of celebrating the Eucharist, in dialogue sermons in Church, far beyond the changes authorized by the Roman authorities. "Canon law is dead," one highly respected theologian of my acquaintance assures his friends.

These new attitudes reflect important shifts in theological thinking. In place of ghettoism and legalism, we have a stress on charity, an affirmation of secular values, a recognition of the positive religious values found outside Catholicism, and specifically of the greater historical fidelity of Protestants than Catholics to important elements of Christ's teaching. In place of individualistic piety, we have greater emphasis on the notion of the people of God involved in a common effort that embraces their whole life, bringing an awareness of the importance of social action and of involvement.

Chicago had a recent example of the practical consequences. Cardinal Meyer and his predecessors had created a tradition of decentralization and personal responsibility, which Archbishop Cody set out on his appointment in 1965 to reverse. He quickly ran into 400 young priests organized into what *Time* called "the closest thing yet to a union of priests," soon decided that if you can't lick 'em you'd better join 'em, ended up by taking credit for the prompt implementation by the archdiocese of the Vatican Council call for a council of priests.

In spite of efforts to hold back *aggiornamento* of the nation's 180,000 nuns, they are being seen, and will be seen increasingly, where the problems are in our society. They are in civil rights, in poverty programs. They are leaving middle-class schools to man community facilities. They are working on staffs of neighborhood centers, serving on the boards of state and local human rights commissions, the Urban League, the NAACP. They are thinking less of the good of their own particular group, seeking ways to join other groups of nuns and lay people for more effective action. Chicago's Urban Apostolate of Sisters, started in 1961, has

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800 nuns working in myriad activities, a center for teenage Spanish speakers, contacts with youth gangs. Some live in one of the apartments of the public-housing complex where they work. Others live in tenements, work in factories, carry union cards.

They have to pay the price of change. With some, the clash between ardent youth and stratified authority ends in separation. With others, the formalism of community life persuades them that they can achieve the goal to which they are dedicated by leaving the convent. Unaccustomed freedom causes others to jump over the traces. Recruits are fewer, in part because the medieval dress and manners suggest irrelevance to many, in part because the dedicated have the alternatives of the youth corps, the poverty corps, the papal volunteers for Latin America and a host of other service organizations.

One area which feels the pinch is Catholic education. But the decline in teaching nuns is only part of its problem. While the system is here to stay, it is both due to change and to become less important in relation to the entire educational system. Increasing costs, for example, are raising the percentage of Catholics in public schools, especially at the university level. The new recognition of the importance of social research and the approach to self-criticism of the Greely-Rossi report and the University of Notre Dame report are clearing the air of prejudices. While they take much steam out of criticisms of the system as religiously divisive and intellectually schizophrenic, they question the value received by the Church for the money. As Catholics de-escalate, they will become more conscious of the values of public education. The rest of the community will become more conscious of the Catholic contribution, look more assiduously for constitutional ways to ease the burden.

Many Catholics are asking out loud if academic freedom and Church control of universities are compatible. The issue has erupted most explosively in the still unresolved clash between St. John's University, Brooklyn, and a group of professors led by a priest, but it is bubbling on many other campuses. A practical solution is being tested in Canada, though the incentive has been primarily economic. To qualify for public funds, several Church-related universities have been transferred to a community board of management, setting up their schools of philosophy and theology as an affiliated college still Church-controlled. I anticipate similar experiments in the United States, both to qualify for public funds and to meet the academic freedom criticisms.

Another significant development is the growing Catholic involvement in the peace movement. The bishops are still back in the traditional pattern of proving their patriotism, which in that context means blind support of current Administration policy. Recognizing the clear absence of consensus, only fifteen have spoken, but all who spoke backed the Administration, Cardinal Spellman quoting with approval Stephen Decatur's blasphemous "my country right or wrong," and only one (Cardinal Shehan) dwelling on the danger of vitiating a moral purpose by the use of immoral means. A recent Gallup poll showed that the percentage of Catholics who approve the President's stand in Vietnam is significantly higher than that of Protestants of Jews. What I think is significant is that it is only 54 per cent. I suspect it would have been 90 or 95 per cent, that is, monolithic, if we hadn't had the Council. Perhaps even more important is the willingness of priests and nuns to be arrested, as in Selma, or spat on by fellow Catholics, as in Chicago. The public witness, the prophetic role of Christianity vis-à-vis society, was previously unknown in American Catholicism.

Both Catholics and others will, accordingly, have to stop asking what is the Catholic position on this, that or the other. I am confident that when the smoke clears away, there will still be clear Catholic positions on a number of basic matters; for example, on the proposition that it is every man's duty to love all other men and to help them according to their need and his means. But we no longer have and won't have reflex reactions on divorce laws, birth control measures, aid to education. We will have to think of Catholics, as we think of other Americans, as people—people with a set of beliefs and moral principles which influence their actions, but not a Pavlovianally conditioned herd responding undiscerningly to stimuli of which they are unconscious.

ANTI-MISSILES

NEW TWIST IN THE ARMS SPIRAL

GEORGE C. WILSON
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Lyndon Johnson, leader of the most powerful nation in the world, is up against the painful limits of his power as he faces one of the most consequential decisions of his Presidency—how to respond to Soviet and Chinese progress in weaponry.

The facts are plain enough. Russia is putting an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system in place to protect its cities and its citizens; the United States is not. Red China is bent on making nuclear weapons of world range; the United States has not decided what to do about it. The President can find no easy answer to these moves, and yet faces obvious political risks if he does nothing about them.

Russia, Pentagon experts insist, is deploying a sophisticated ABM sytsem—not a few smoky missiles its technicians have built in the cellar to scare the West. Pentagon leaders credit the Soviet with a long-range anti-missile almost as good as our own and believe the ABM system is an "area" defense—not just protection for a few cities or military bases.

An area defense depends on missiles of 400-mile range or more which, like a boxer's left, fends off the enemy's

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punch before it gets near the vitals. The nuclear warhead of the defending missile incapacitates the enemy's incoming missiles. The name of the U.S. missile for this role is the Nike Zeus. The long reach of an ABM system is backed up by deployment of a close-in missile, designed to intercept any stray rockets which escaped the long-range network. The United States has the Sprint for close-in defense.

Both types of missiles are guided by a bewilderingly complex radar hooked into a versatile computer. The electronic systems both aim the defending missiles at the incoming ICBMs and distinguish between real live warheads and decoys. The United States believes it excels the Soviets in radar technology, but weapons experts hastily add that the Russian equipment appears good enough to do the job.

In two previous false starts, Russia appeared to be ringing the key cities of Moscow and Leningrad with Sprint-type ABMs. This did not especially worry U.S. policy makers because such a defense could not neutralize our nuclear deterrent. U.S. ICBMs, it was clear to Russia and the rest of the world, would still be able to destroy Soviet military bases and most of its society. But the area defense the Soviets have now embarked upon is something else again. If the Russians can protect their whole country from U.S. missiles, why should they not contemplate attacking first and relying on their anti-missiles to protect them from unacceptable retaliation? It does not follow necessarily that they would, but military planners work on the assumption that they might.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has a ready answer for this drastic prediction: keep the U.S. offense so far ahead of the Russian defense that it will remain perfectly clear to the Soviet leadership that a first strike would trigger an unbearable response.

McNamara's position involves constant improvement of the U.S. offensive missiles now standing in concrete silos and being pushed around the world under water by Polaris submarines. The Pentagon is spending millions to make it harder for an enemy to destroy U.S. missiles.

The Poseidon missile is the leading example. It will be carried in submarines now loaded with Polaris missiles. Being under water and on the move, the Poseidon cannot readily be destroyed by an enemy first strike. Also, the Poseidon's nuclear warhead would break up into several little ones when it reached the enemy's defense. This shotgun blast, the theory goes, could not be entirely stopped



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by any ABM system now within reach of the technology.

If President Johnson were to accept the argument that the best defense is a good offense, he could indeed save the nation billions of dollars. The cost of an ABM system for the United States is a minimum of $3 billion for a "thin defense" and $40 billion for a much better (though by no means perfect) one, including fallout shelters. But uncomfortable technical and political arguments are being raised against this option. Some of Secretary McNamara's own civilian weapons experts believe it would be dangerous to rely solely on the potential of retaliation; that the United States must follow Russia's lead and start putting a defense in place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff —although they would be expected to err on the side of too much offensive weaponry—also favor an ABM defense for the United States. And several Senators and Representatives of both parties are already demanding that President Johnson do as much to protect his people as Russian leaders are doing to protect theirs.

Congress, after listening to both McNamara and the Joint Chiefs, lined up on the side of the ABM. An overwhelming majority of the Congress voted $167.9 million more for the Nike X than the $446 million McNamara requested for this fiscal year (ending June 30). The extra money was to be used to gear up for actually producing the Nike X—the step prior to installing the system.

Conceivably, President Johnson could announce to the Congress this month that he has decided to go along and spend this extra money for Nike X. But that would not really settle the issue. The new Congress (now that McNamara has announced what the lawmakers were told in secret last year about Soviet ABM progress) will demand a commitment from the President on whether he intends to take the plunge and actually deploy Nike X. Many Republicans in Congress, fresh from their November victories, will exploit the political capital in the anti-missile gap, as the Democrats once did with the "missile gap."

While President Johnson and Secretary McNamara were able to put off the day of reckoning during this past Congressional session, by declaring there was still time to do more research on Nike X, the 1967 political climate here and abroad all but rules out another postponement. The go-or-no-go-decision moment is here. By committing himself to Nike X production and deployment in his January State of the Union Message, President Johnson could mute the cries of the hawks. But such a statement would also doom much of his domestic program, for the lawmakers would react by making budget cuts in the Great Society to compensate for the anti-missile defense.



Abroad, a statement by the country with the most missiles at its command that it was installing an anti-missile defense would prompt "how about us?" questions from our allies. For example, West Germany on the NATO front line is staring at 750 Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles. West German leaders might be expected to demand some kind of Nike X umbrella.

The President could resist the military and political pressures and flatly state that the United States was going to sit out the anti-missile race. But the notion that Russia is building something the United States does not have is likely to eclipse any arguments the President could muster against going ahead with Nike X deployment.

These painful options underscore the desirability of making some kind of diplomatic breakthrough with the Russians on the arms race. But our intelligence information indicates the precious moment for such an agreement has passed. Russia appears to be committed to both an extensive ABM system and faster ICBM production. Not that the diplomatic route will not be tried. But even if this approach should show promise, how could either the United States or Russia draw China into an agreement? China is making fast progress on nuclear missiles; the Pentagon specialists who know most about nuclear weapons are the very ones who take that progress most seriously.

For example, Washington has evidence that in the last test, Mao's technicians definitely put an advanced type of warhead on a medium-range missile and fired it successfully at supersonic speed. Also, the warhead was made of enriched Uranium 235, the same tricky material the United States uses for its most sophisticated warheads. Such scientific prowess makes a big Chinese hydrogen bomb only a matter of time.

How many warheads and how many missiles for carrying them China has today is the subject of a wide range of guesses. The pattern of China's nuclear test program, however, shows it is not embarked on a deliberate, science-oriented weapons effort. Instead, Western arms specialists see the military running the program with the aim of getting nuclear weapons ready to use as quickly as possible.

China's neighbors are clearly aware of this. That is why India talks of building nuclear weapons of its own, even though its people do not have enough to eat; and Japan—the only nation to know the horror of being hit by an atomic bomb—considers the same course. How would India and Japan feel if the United States, thousands of miles away from either China or Russia, spent billions on an anti-missile defense while they stood naked to missile attack?

China's nuclear prowess also decreases what little chance there may be of reaching an accommodation with the Russians on the anti-missile. The Kremlin could well argue that it needed an ABM system for the threat at its back.

Secretary McNamara's timetable calls for Red China to have a medium-range ballistic missile as early as 1967, and an intercontinental ballistic missile as early as 1975. China's ICBM, McNamara believes, could be effectively stopped—at least the first ones developed before they car-

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ried sophisticated penetration aids—by a thin anti-missile defense. But since it takes about six years to install an anti-missile system, the time for doing this is growing short.

Besides the missile races now threatening the peace of the world, the nations involved still could resort to bombers if missile defenses appeared effective. A Nike X missile defense would not stop modern bombers, like the ones Russia has developed and China may develop eventually. Modern bombers fly under defending radar warning systems, zooming over the nap of the earth at speeds of 1,200 to 1,800 miles per hour. Pentagon strategists hold that it would be senseless to build a defense against missiles unless U.S. bomber defenses were upgraded at the same time.

With this latest twist in the arms spiral—missiles, anti-missiles, supersonic bombers—we have actually reached the point where a Secretary of Defense declares that a nuclear attack would kill 130 million Americans if there were no anti-missile defense or 60 million if there were one costing $30 to $40 billion. President Johnson's challenge, then, as he makes his Nike X decision is to find the road leading away from Armageddon. The world seems to have lost its way.

SHALE OIL: THE SLEEPING GIANT

ROSCOE FLEMING
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Denver

Except for coal, America's greatest reserve source of energy lies like a sleeping giant in the oil shale of western Colorado, Utah and Wyoming. Here, in the bed of a fossil lake covering some 20,000 square miles, is enough energy to supply the nation for hundreds of years. It is estimated by the Geological Survey at 4,000 billion barrels of oil. (See Fleming, "Shale Oil: The Cartel's Ace in the Hole," *The Nation*, March 15, 1965.)

Most of the deposit is too lean for economic recovery by the standard method of mining the shale and then burning some of it to drive the oil out of the rest as vapor, which condenses into liquid. But the richest shales, even now competitive with petroleum, alone contain 80 billion barrels, enough to supply the nation for twenty years.

Development of the shale resource will increase as our liquid reserves dwindle. Hans H. Landsberg of Resources for the Future estimates that by 2000 A.D., only thirty-four years away, the nation will be consuming oil at three times the present rate, with allied nations using five times as much. We shall have consumed 250 billion barrels by then —if we can find and buy it—and he sees no way our known reserves can supply this, since the rosiest estimate of the yield from known reserves is less than 100 billion barrels.

Luckily, most of the shale area is still in public hands. Private claimants got title to about 15 per cent in the 1920s, but in 1931 the shale lands were withdrawn from entry and the public retained much of the richer reserves. Overall, this is a treasure sufficient to pay off the national debt from royalties alone (at the usual one-eighth to the landowner), and Sen. Paul Douglas of Illinois has suggested that it be reserved by law for this purpose. Rep. Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, chairman of the powerful House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, also favors leasing, not selling, the shale lands. He recently led a tour of the area by members and advisers of the Public Land Law Review Commission, charged by Congress with offering a unified public land policy by 1968.

Private claimants have filed many lawsuits seeking to acquire some of these lands. The public won a test case in Colorado. Claimants contended that agricultural entries under the Homestead Act—the historic 160-acre allotments—carried title to the underlying minerals, even though the law required the claimant to waive such title. The federal district court held in this case that shale under about 200,000 acres belongs to the government.

In another group of cases yet to be tried, claimants challenge the government's contention that denial of claims went for so many years unchallenged that the claims have lapsed for want of action. All such cases will probably reach the Supreme Court. Several thousand claims have also been filed for dawsonite, in the shale area. Dawsonite is a mixture of sodium and alumina, subject to claim under the mining laws. The implication is that miners might take out oil shale along with the dawsonite. But the Interior Department notes that a 1954 law vetoes this.

State officials naturally seek development. Colorado's legislature quietly exempted shale oil from the 5 per cent state severance tax on minerals; and exempted 27.5 per cent of shale-oil income from the state income tax. The latter provision parallels the traditional federal exemption on income from oil and gas, ostensibly to finance exploration for new resources. But it is anomalous here, since the oil shales are highly visible, ribboning 1,000-foot cliffs horizontally like the leaves of a book (hence the name "Book Cliffs").

Economists J. J. Ryan and John G. Welles of the University of Denver have made a study pointing to the imperative need for the state to prepare adequately for a "shale rush" larger than the historic gold rushes. They say that a shale industry producing 1 million barrels daily by traditional methods would provide 42,000 new jobs, bring 112,000 people into the area, create a yearly payroll from shale alone of $300 million, attract capital investment of $2 billion, and stimulate the purchase of $200 million of industrial supplies. They strongly advise federal and state cooperation to avoid the growth of a vast rural slum. So far the state has ignored their recommendations, although Gov. John A. Love (R.) is criticizing the federal government for what he calls procrastination and delay in throwing open the shale lands for private development.

Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall in 1962 named a six-

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person advisory board headed by Joseph L. Fisher of Resources for the Future. In 1964, this body recommended a unified policy of development, but split hopelessly over what such a policy should include. However, Dr. John Kenneth Galbraith, who was a board member, continues to insist that an economical and efficient method of getting out the oil must precede any major decisions upon policy.

The present extraction process actually began in an emergency project adopted during World War II, when Hitler's submarines were sinking our oil tankers. For many years it has been continued in a minimal way, ostensibly under direction of the Bureau of Mines, but with the actual work done by an industry group. Galbraith advocates appropriating much more money—"some tens of millions perhaps; the cost of an atomic weapon"—for a real attempt to find the best process. He also notes that surface development by burning would stain the nation's skies with shale smoke and that millions of tons of ashes would have to be piled somewhere, and he thinks the nation would balk at such destruction of nature.

Today there is increasing discussion of an exceedingly modern solution: to explode hydrogen bombs deep in or under the shale. The explosions would create huge cisterns of broken shale; the residual heat would gasify the oil, which could then be brought up through shafts drilled from the surface. It is estimated that this technique would cost less than methods presently used; it would sacrifice much oil, but no more than the present procedure, which uses half the oil to drive out the remainder.

The overall need, after an economic process has been found, is for a government policy that will insure the public a fair return on its own possessions.

SNAP JOBS AND CHEAP MONEY

URUGUAY'S DOUBLE INFLATION

RICHARD O'MARA
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Montevideo

The color and flamboyance of Uruguay's November 27 election faded quickly after the returns were counted and retired air force General Oscar Daniel Gestido was confirmed as the first man in fifteen years to occupy the Presidency as a single office. The inhabitants of this small River Plata country are satisfied that they have again proved themselves among the world's most adept practitioners of practical democracy. A sense of expectation has replaced the electoral enthusiasm, and Uruguayans look to next March, when Gestido takes office and his new reform program goes into effect.

The 1.2 million people who went to the polls that hot, bright Sunday took a big step. They threaded through a labyrinth of political programs and candidates, and elected to change from the Swiss-style governing council of nine men to one chief executive. (The collegiate government was resorted to in 1952 to mitigate the bitterness of political contests for the Presidency.) They also threw out the conservative Blanco (white) Party, which had been in control for eight years, and returned the more liberal Colorado (red) Party to power. The deeper, substantive change that now remains is to restore Uruguay from near-economic chaos and social unrest. This will be a formidable task, for it demands of the people harsh retrenchment and a virtual readjustment of moral attitude.

The Uruguayan writer, Mario Benedetti, in a fit of exasperation, once described his country as "the only office in the world to be accorded the status of a republic." It was a wry but apt description, for Uruguay is glutted with bureaucracy. Of the 2.5 million population, more than 200,000 are public employees; the ratio is approximately one in thirteen. More than three-fourths of the national budget is allocated to the salaries of these government workers, who with their families constitute more than 20 per cent of the population.

Uruguay's present economic situation is alarming. Its foreign debt is well over $500 million; its yearly income from exports is about $170 million. The country has lost the confidence of the international financial community, and in 1965 the Blanco government was forced to melt down large quantities of gold coins for deposit in United States banks as a guarantee on a renegotiation of debts. Payments due in 1966 and 1967 will require half the income from this year's exports.

Domestically, the budgetary deficit in 1965 was more than $40 million. The inflation has depressed the peso on the free market from eleven to the dollar in 1963 to today's eighty-one. Inflation in 1965 reached 80 per cent, and was above 31 per cent for the first nine months of 1966. The gross national product is dropping, and some 200,000 people are out of work.

But Uruguay suffers a more pernicious inflation than the deterioration of its money; it is the inflation of unproductive people. In this welfare state, only fourteen people out of a hundred work in any sort of productive industry, and most of these are in the rural areas. Adding to the economic drag of the bureaucratic army are some 300,000 persons on pension. The passive population—including children, nonworking women, pensioners, et al.—is around 35 per cent.

Uruguay is an example of what can happen to a country when an effective two-party system goes to seed. By tradition here, the Colorados govern and the Blancos provide opposition. The Colorados ruled for ninety-three years before being ousted in the 1958 elections. Unaccustomed to playing the foil to the administration, Colorado politicians in recent years found that individual collusion across party lines could be more rewarding in terms of personal gain than united opposition. Numerous inter-party deals were made, and before long the Uruguayan congress be-

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came a mass of factions. Laws were passed to provide outrageous privileges for politicians, and corruption spread to every branch of government and into the state industries. "*Coima*," the bribe, became a way of life.

The fragmentation of Uruguay's two traditional parties was never more evident than in the November elections. Both parties ran three Presidential candidates each, and the constitutional reform plan that gained the majority was drafted jointly by factions within the Blanco and Colorado Parties. It was opposed by many Colorados and Blancos, and by the Communists, who offered their own plan. In all, four plans for constitutional reform were offered to the voters, and ten Presidential candidates.

One of the more blatant abuses of power in recent years was the passage of a law which allowed legislators to import automobiles free of duty and tax—a profitable business in a country where import restrictions have driven the price of vehicles through the ceiling. Nor do the Solons of Uruguay's Legislative Palace scorn ostentation. One politician recently drove down Montevideo's 18th of July Avenue in a car equipped with a bar, refrigerator, television, hi-fi, phone and various other accouterments. Only four of Uruguay's thirty-one senators and ninety-nine deputies opposed the "auto law." Congress also passed a law allowing its members to borrow from government banks at 1 per cent interest. There are politicians in Uruguay who owe the government more than a million pesos.

The general attitude of permissiveness allowed smuggling to grow into the primary industry, thereby robbing the state of needed revenue. One disgusted Uruguayan complained not long ago: "We have imported enough Swiss watches to provide for twenty countries the size of our own. We imported insulin for 20 million diabetics. It is now in Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil, exported by contrabandists."

As corruption in government became chronic, politicians turned to patronage and demagogy to hold on to their sinecures. The ranks of the bureaucrats swelled; the nation's wealth was squandered; prices started to climb. With the onset of rapid inflation, labor insisted upon massive pay raises to keep up with the cost of living, and the politicians were forced to grant the demands.

Except for Argentina, Uruguay has the most militant labor movement in Latin America. Former Interior Minister Adolfo Tejera said: "Syndical power is incommensurate with the reality of the country and is producing a deep fissure in the social fabric." There were more than 600 strikes in 1966. The country's financial machinery was crippled in October and November by a three-week strike of state bank employees. Strikes and sudden stoppages in

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critical industries are common: longshoremen, postal and power workers, transport, have all been out.

The Blanco government blamed labor intransigence on the Communists. The small, legal and bombastic Communist party (Frente Izquierdista de Liberación, FIDEL) does wield power in the labor movement, though not as much as many Blanco and Colorado leaders like to believe. The Communist party finished third in the November elections, slightly ahead of the diminutive Christian Democratic party, but well behind the Blancos and Colorados. It has only one seat in the senate and three in the chamber of deputies.

In Uruguay, blue-collar workers usually earn more than white-collar workers, which is not too surprising since most of the latter are unskilled government clerks. It probably should be that way, too, since the former are engaged in more productive labor than the bureaucrats. But in some areas labor costs have risen beyond reason.

It was against this dismal panorama that incumbent national governing council President Alberto Heber (Blanco) early in 1966 first seriously called into question the practicability of the collegiate government system. "This is a small country with a lot of problems," he said. "It is not necessary to have nine men instead of one President."

Gestido, who had recently resigned from the council, endorsed Heber's view: "The republic is facing a crisis situation, and we must have organs responsible and flexible enough for unity of action." Both men, of course, had Presidential ambitions.

Most experts concede that the overriding motive for making the changeover was to provide a political and administrative machinery capable of putting the country back into shape economically. It seems to some of them that the November election offered Uruguay a last chance to resolve its problems with order and liberty.

A military coup has been rumored now for more than a year. To most Uruguayans the idea is shocking: the country enjoys its reputation as a free, democratic state primarily because it is not afflicted with the militarism that plagues its neighbors. It has no conscription and only a small professional armed force.

Fear is also widespread that the hysterically anti-Communist military governments in Brazil and Argentina have already made secret plans to intervene in Uruguay if it reverts to chaos or allows an extreme leftist regime to take over. Not long ago, *Marcha*, Montevideo's influential leftist weekly, reminded Uruguayans that "independence for Uruguay was not a gift, and the principal enemy was not Spain."

This cryptic message was well understood here, for in a sense, Uruguay won its independence twice: first from Spain, and then from Argentina and Brazil. It wasn't until 1870—forty-two years after Uruguay proclaimed its independence from Spain—that it finally struggled free from the influence of its two largest neighbors and became sovereign in more than name only. It has followed since then an independent foreign policy, the pillar of which is nonintervention. But in the Eastern Republic, as Uruguay is often called, fear remains of the two giants that hem it in on three sides. And because Uruguay is a haven for political refugees from these countries, pressure from Brasilia and Buenos Aires is fairly constant.

Colorado President-elect Oscar Gestido has already distinguished himself as an effective administrator. In the 1950s he made far-reaching improvements in the sluggish national railroad system. He served usefully as chairman of the Welfare Commission during the floods of 1959. He was elected to join the Colorado minority in the governing council in 1962.

The new constitution under which he will govern gives him power to send "emergency laws" to congress; these, if not approved, automatically become law. He will have the right to dissolve congress if it obstructs his reforms, and call elections within ninety days. While congress is out he can rule by decree. His term of office is for five years, and he cannot succeed himself.

Gestido sums up his administrative and governing theory in three words: "reordering, recuperation and dynamism." Though he has never discussed details, sources close to him say that he intends to freeze wages, spur exports, and reduce imports to stem the flight of capital.

One problem which he indicates he intends to tackle is the growing imbalance between the rural and urban populations. In a way, this is basically what is wrong with Uruguay. Montevideo now contains more than a third of the nation's inhabitants. It was called by one scholar "the suction pump" whose "castles have been built and streets paved with the beef, wool and hides of the provinces." Funds from the export of these products finance the country's welfare and social services, and the benefits go mainly to the city dwellers.

Continued neglect of the farming industry has caused ranchers to stop expanding production, and the failure to extend social legislation equitably to the countryside has driven peons and workers into the city. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that Uruguay's farms and breeding ranches are producing only about one-third of their potential. The country has almost no other natural resources.

This diminution in production—therefore in national income—has seriously affected the social services themselves. Pensioners often get paid months late; some don't get paid at all, and salaries are often in arrears. Still, the rush to the cities continues. Uruguay, "the world's first welfare state," is caught in an uncontrolled race between prices and wages.

At this point, the only certainty about the future is that neither Gestido, nor any man alone, will be able to set Uruguay on its feet without widespread popular support. The new constitution gives him the power to buck the old-line political cliques, if he is willing to use it. But if he cannot make labor withhold its incessant demands, if he cannot curtail wholesale smuggling and bribery in government; if he cannot, in short, draw out of the people a new moral attitude, he will fail. And Uruguay will fail in its attempt to prove that truly representative democracy can be the alternative to militarism in Latin America.

But the Uruguayans are an intelligent people, and they demonstrated in the November elections that they understood the need for change—that, indeed, the fate of their country may depend on it. This understanding can be Gestido's greatest asset.

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

That Old-Time Aggression

ON AGGRESSION. *By Konrad Lorenz. Translated by Marjorie Kerr Wilson. Harcourt, Brace & World. 306 pp. $5.75.*

THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. *By Robert Ardrey. Atheneum Publishers. 390 pp. $6.95.*

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

Mr. Scott, research professor of psychology at Bowling Green (Ohio) University, is the author of Animal Behavior, Aggression, *and with John L. Fuller* Genetics and the Development of Social Behavior in the Dog (*all University of Chicago Press*).

The control of destructive violence between individuals and nations is one of the important practical problems of our times. Its consequences are so great that it deserves a major scientific effort directed toward its solution; and its causes are so many and so various that almost every discipline, from mathematics through physiology and biology, to the social sciences, have something to contribute. *On Aggression* is such a contribution by the distinguished European ethologist, Konrad Lorenz.

It is a beautifully written and translated book, and follows a line of argument which almost anyone can understand. Lorenz apparently began it in reaction against Freud's interpretation of aggression as an impulse of destruction directed toward others and oneself. He points out that fighting behavior in the animal kingdom had evolved in many different ways and usually serves some useful function, such as the dispersal of animals throughout their living space, and the division of land into breeding territories for adequate food for the young. And he describes human aggressive impulses as probably having had some such constructive function in primitive man. Aggression is therefore not necessarily an evil, but is evil because it has been distorted from its original function.

Though no modern student of the evolution of animal behavior would quarrel with this viewpoint, the book is disappointing nevertheless, both from a scientific and a practical point of view. Lorenz explains aggressive behavior on the basis of instinct, an idea which was popular around the turn of the century, and his solution for the problem, sublimation, was presented with equal eloquence and greater practicality by William James in his essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War" in 1910.

To understand why a modern biologist would publish a book which leaves out of consideration most of the scientific discoveries of the past fifty years requires some knowledge of Lorenz. He is a very intelligent person who picks up ideas quickly and who has a great deal of verbal and written fluency. He also has the ability to make friends quickly and to communicate a sense of excitement, and by these personal qualities he has been able to inspire a great many people to enter the field of animal behavior. He is also kindly and humanitarian, and this comes through in both his personal contacts and his writing.

But he is a very narrow specialist, who primarily knows the beha ior of birds, and particularly that of ducks and geese, on which his book has an excellent chapter. He evidently reads very little other than material which is directly related to his own specialty. Consequently, when he began observing the behavior of birds from the viewpoint of native behavior, or instinct, he went back to the writings of other students of bird life, Wallace Craig and Whitman, for his theoretical concepts. Lorenz quotes articles published in 1918, before modern geneticists had begun to work out the consequences of the facts of Mendelian genetics in relation to evolution, and before publication of much of the modern work on the physiology of the emotions and appetites. These ideas of instinct are thus pre-Mendelian and pre-physiological, and in this day such a classical theory of instinct forms a very incomplete and inadequate explanation of behavior.

One of the major points in Lorenz's theory is the spontaneity of aggression. But for a physiologist there must be a demonstration of chemical and physical changes within the body which would lead to such "spontaneous" aggressive behavior. A series of these changes are well known in the case of hunger. The situation with respect to the emotion of anger is quite different. Beginning with the studies of the American physiologist, Walter B. Cannon, whose book on "Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage" was published in 1929, it has been shown that the emotion of anger originates in one portion of the brain, the hypothalamus, and the stimulation of this area with electrodes in an animal will produce reactions very similar to anger. Without such stimulation the animal is quiet. Evidence obtained from the removal of parts of the brain indicates that certain other areas have a stimulating effect on anger, and that these are balanced by other portions which inhibit it. Stimulation from the outside, as the pain of a blow, will upset the balance and cause anger. Thus we have a mechanism which prolongs and magnifies the effects of external stimulation, but no mechanism for building up the first stimulation from within. There is no internal change corresponding to the change in blood sugar which results in hunger.

This may appear to be a fine technical point, but it has one important result. If Lorenz is right, then man cannot lead a happy, peaceful existence, but must continually be sublimating the spontaneous "drive" which accumulates within him. If the physiologists are correct, then it is theoretically possible for man to lead a happy and peaceful existence, provided he is not continually stimulated to violence. Sublimation will have its uses because in any practical situation there will always be some accidental stimulation toward violence, but it is only one of the many techniques provided by modern scientific knowledge for the control of aggression.

As for other major causes of aggression, such as heredity or training, Lorenz simply omits them. But we know that through appropriate training methods a mouse, for example, will attack females and even infant mice, something which mice normally never do. A male mouse, by other methods, can be trained to be completely peaceful. Lorenz has also missed one of the major recent findings of research on animal behavior (and this may be because of his lack of acquaintance with research done on mammals). Social organization is not something born into an animal but something which is developed; and if social organization is disturbed, harmless or even beneficial aggressive behavior can be transformed into destructive violence. The violent baboons in the London zoo studied by Zuckerman were a group of individuals strange to one another and hence a disorganized society. The undisturbed societies of baboons

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studied by Washburn and DeVore on the South African plains present an entirely different picture. Fighting is present but controlled by a dominance order, and chiefly directed against predators, and one sees the baboons risking their lives for the benefit of a group. Thus a baboon may develop destructive violence under conditions of social disorganization, whereas under conditions of social organization he may develop peaceful and cooperative behavior, direct fighting into useful channels, and may act in a manner which might well be described as altruistic. One wonders whether the same might not be said of man.

There is an element in human behavior, however, which goes beyond this simple formulation. Men have discovered that they can organize for the purpose of destruction and violence, and that such trained groups will overcome any individual or untrained group. This presents a problem which can be solved only on the level of human social organization.

In brief, fighting is a complex phenomenon, taking many forms, and is stimulated and controlled by many different factors. Any "single-factor" explanation, such as that of instinct, is necessarily incomplete. To give Lorenz proper credit, he would probably write a different book if he were to write it today, since in a more recent volume he has begun to incorporate the phenomenon of learning into his theories of the evolution of behavior.

The Territorial Imperative is a very different kind of book, although Konrad Lorenz is one of Ardrey's heroes. Briefly stated, Ardrey's thesis, carried over from his earlier book, *African Genesis,* is that human aggression has an even simpler basis than that postulated by Lorenz, namely "man's instinct for territoriality." This is presented so naively that even an unscientific reader is unlikely to take the book seriously, and Ardrey himself realizes that the evidence from field studies of primates goes against his ideas.

Ardrey's book also can be better understood in terms of the history of its author. Ardrey began his career as a dramatist, with little or no formal training in science. *Territorial Imperative* is better theatre than it is science reporting: full of entertainment and wild analogies.

In the early 1940s I published a scientific paper demonstrating that there were inherited differences between the fighting capacities of two pure strains of mice. Males of the gray strain were irritable and quick to start a fight, whereas those of the black strain were slow to start, but once the fighting began almost always won over the grays. After its publication, I was interviewed by a newspaper reporter who wanted me to say that this situation was "just like ourselves and the Germans." It was some minutes before I could persuade him that the resemblance was purely superficial: that the differences between the behavior of Germans and ourselves was mostly due to culture rather than to any profound biological difference.

This level of science reporting is demonstrated in full strength in Ardrey's book. To him, a band of lemurs in Madagascar is just like a modern human nation.

Ardrey has read widely in the scientific literature on territoriality, but his ideas, if not as wildly unsophisticated as my reporter's, are equally uncritical. He has written these down as they came to him while reading, and the result is a sort of intellectual pizza pie, with tasty tidbits of information embedded in a mass of partially baked ideas. This is too bad, because a good popular account of territoriality could be written.

The popularization of scientific information in our society is a very important task, as the ultimate usefulness of science depends upon its getting into the minds of as many people as possible. But this must be done in both a readable and scientifically authentic way. The reader who wishes to know about territoriality may be attracted by the title of Ardrey's book, but what he will get is entertainment. For authentic information he will have to go to original sources.

The Ordinariness of Sodomy

ONE IN TWENTY: A Study of Homosexuality in Men and Women. *By Bryan Magee. Stein & Day. 192 pp. $5.95.*

THE BOYS OF BOISE. *By John Gerassi. The Macmillan Company. 328 pp. $5.95.*

JACK LEAVITT

Mr. Leavitt is a member of the bar in California and Illinois, and is a practicing attorney in the San Francisco Bay Area.

Homosexuality is a fact. So real is this condition that Jehovah denounced it as an abomination whose practitioners should "surely be put to death"; so real that an estimated 4 per cent to 16 per cent of our population is homosexual and, according to Dr. Alfred Kinsey, 37 per cent of the American male population has at least some overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm between adolescence and old age; and so real that the designers of the newest transportation system in the United States, a multi-million-dollar project linking several counties in the San Francisco Bay area, have blueprinted stations without rest rooms to frustrate "undesirable elements."

Whether homosexuality can most accurately be described as a benefit, a disease or a crime, however, depends less on what we observe than on the way we interpret our knowledge. For Donald Webster Cory, an American homosexual:

> . . . in my knowledge that our number is legion, I raise my head high and proclaim that we, the voiceless millions, are human beings, entitled to breathe the fresh air and enjoy, with all humanity, the pleasures of life and love on God's green earth.

For Peter Wildeblood, a British homosexual:

> I am no more proud of my condition than I would be of having a glass-eye or a hare-lip. On the other hand, I am no more ashamed of it than I would be of being colour-blind or of writing with my left hand.

For the Oregon Supreme Court, some fifty years ago:

> In the order of nature the nourishment of the human body is accomplished by the operation of the alimentary canal, beginning with the mouth and ending with the rectum. In this process food enters the first opening, the mouth, and residuum and waste are discharged through the nether opening of the rectum. The natural functions of the organs for the reproduction of the species are entirely different from those of the nutritive system. It is self-evident that the use of either opening of the alimentary canal for the purpose of sexual copulation is against the natural design of the human body. In other words, it is an offense against nature.

As competing philosophies, these different viewpoints operate on vastly unequal terms. When a state government insists that homosexual acts are evil, the ultimate leverage for its argument is the number of years for which it can imprison those individuals who actively disagree with its statutory notions. When homosexual practitioners urge clemency for their way of life, they do so as an afflicted minority, asking much and offering little. And yet, homosexuality flourishes—and the state survives.

Focusing on this subject, two recent authors—Bryan Magee and John Gerassi—have presented independent briefs for understanding and tolerance as they have tried to show the ordinariness of sodomy,

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an activity which historically was "not to be named among Christians." Magee is a British television performer who realized that his thirty-minute programs on male and female homosexuality were inadequate for the complexity of his findings; Gerassi is a former editor of *Time* magazine who found his medium equally deficient. By such deficiencies are cloth-bound authors born.

Both writers are compassionate, intelligent and perceptive, though their works have unequal merit. By far the more poised narrator and craftsman, Magee writes from the perspective of an individual who might be (but is not) a homosexual seeking meaning for himself. Gerassi writes as a reporter who observes and disapproves of a series of criminal trials that upset a middle-class community which prided itself on respectability. For Magee, the measure is the individual man or woman; for Gerassi, it is social justice.

Magee writes—and writes well—about the English and European experience with men and women who are, or have an ordinary chance to be, normal in every respect but a libidinous attraction to persons of their own sex. He relies intelligently on Dr. Kinsey's identification of a sexual continuum where (in Kinsey's words) "only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separate pigeon holes."

In what might be his most effective point, Magee notes: "If we were relaxed and a hand in the dark caressed our sex organs our physical response would be automatic despite the fact that we had no way of knowing whether it was a man's hand or a woman's hand." While many of us would probably protect our genitals from all strangers (and many friends), once we yielded our assent to affectionate manipulation we would react in the same way to the person of our choice or to anyone else who secretly knew how to please us.

Gerassi writes—and writes with disorganized sincerity—about the attempt in Boise, Ida., during 1955-57 to "Crush the Monster" of "moral perversion" that had teen-age boys allegedly being seduced by adult males, and adult males unquestionably enjoying sexual relations with other adult males. Possibly inaugurated as a political attack on the city administration, the Boise prosecutions soon became a vengeful onslaught that ultimately "made a mockery of Idahoan justice and revealed that such an investigation, once unchained, could turn up homosexuals in every sector of the community."

(While Magee records that, "the very first homosexual couple I got to know met each other in church," Gerassi observes that, as a result of the scandal, "you never saw so many men going out to the bars at night with their wives and girl friends.")

The authors concede that homosexual adults should be prohibited from molesting other individuals, particularly minors, but indicate that an adult male who entices a youthful male should be classified and dealt with like the adult male who entices a youthful female. Corruption of the young, while often fashionable, need not be made a constitutional prerogative, regardless of the sex or sexes involved.

What, then, shall we do about consenting adults of the same sex who, in private, make love to each other? Given an opportunity to establish rules of conduct, Magee would say, "I hold it as a principle of fundamental importance that people should not necessarily be prevented from doing things that I find disgusting." Gerassi would add: "Consenting adult homosexuals do no harm—why should so many of them be discriminated against?"

Studying Magee's credo, we can readily agree that his personal inclinations should not "necessarily" inspire a penal law. But when other considerations exist, we might not care to sponsor an activity just *because* Magee finds it "disgusting." As for Gerassi's premise that consenting adult homosexuals "do no harm," we ought to be shy of such self-contained reasoning. By arguing from a "harmless" assumption, he reaches the only conclusion he leaves available; dispute the assumption and the conclusion fails. For example, consent, standing alone, is not the key to harmlessness in legal contemplation. We have long-established laws against other consensual activities between men, like dueling, bookmaking and sales of narcotics.

We cannot say of a homosexual, as we can of a hunchback, that such an individual must not be punished because he has no personal guilt even though he might terrify children by his appearance. The hunchback's imperfections are hereditary, the result of a genetic cataclysm that stamped him in the womb. He never had a chance. But homosexuality is not hereditary. Except for an inconsequential number of cases, persons whose attitudes demonstrate that they are mislabeled "men" are not equipped with subcutaneous female organs, awaiting the surgeon's knife to bring them happiness. Instead, homosexuality is an outgrowth of environmental tensions, believed by many to be triggered by a defective relationship between a son and his father.

We would be foolish to claim that a homosexual "chose" his way of life because, as a child, he selected a socially objectionable behavior pattern with full knowledge of the consequences. Yet we



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

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would be hard pressed to excuse him for his conduct (assuming our clemency is requested) on no other ground than his *inability to control and overcome his* youthful surroundings. Each of us, when confronted with a breach of legal duty, might shrug, "I can't help it. That's just the way I am."

To limit such claims of innocence or irresponsibility, the law makes distinctions between the sane and the insane. The distinctions are often absurd but in their ideal form would divide the perpetrators of criminal acts into two groups: those who had the ability to avoid the crime by making a little more effort, and those whose intellect and emotions were so defective they could not help themselves. Those who "voluntarily" committed crimes are punished; those who could do nothing else but act as they did are treated for their anti-social weaknesses.

Our well-intentioned citizens who hope to find some compromise solution for the homosexual problem often suggest that homosexuals, being sick, should routinely be treated instead of punished. In justifying this course, we show contempt for earlier societies that jeered at their lunatics and, instead, readily institutionalize and force cures on all sorts of people whose conduct we dislike, assuring them that medical and psychiatric help is nothing to be ashamed of. Unfortunately for these aspirations, some homosexuals are as content with their own lives as heterosexuals are with their affairs, a mutually smug arrangement which overlooks the fact that half the hospital beds in the United States are occupied by psychiatric patients.

In our search for answers, then, we must ultimately ask ourselves the irksome question: is homosexuality really a problem? If so, should it be considered as a never-ending emergency, or might it be dealt with by such mutual enlightenment as the Christian good fellowship which modified the historical exchange of massacres between Catholics and Protestants?

For those who believe that God's words must be obeyed literally, homosexuals are evil and should be destroyed. The only compromise to take place should be between the criminal's body and some avenging stones.

For those who accept the moral precepts of the Bible but shy at massacres, homosexuals must somehow be prevented from harming socially valuable institutions, like the family, by enjoying and advocating an evil course of conduct. The moment even one of us becomes degenerate, these logicians believe, all mankind will be in danger. By a categorical imperative, a Kantian infection, millions

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of honorable men, lured they know not how, will take to one another's mattresses and commit race suicide. Such a view, it seems, exists with greatest fury when men are wary of their own virtue. "Unless sodomists are punished for their lewd, contemptible, depraved, disgusting habits," they ask, "what will keep *me* from joining them?"

For those of us who doubt that our own ways are perfect, who fear that vice is less attractive than moralists advertise it to be, who resent electronically armed police agents at our keyholes, homosexuality between consenting adults is just something else that people do. Few of us would have spent yesterday exactly as we did spend it if we knew we were going to die today. If, on any eternal accounting, each of us is likely to be depressed that his life eroded away through perfectly virtuous stages, we can afford to let others blunder in whatever private fashion they choose. Their pleasures in no way corrupt us.

Regardless of which justification we use in choosing a social response to homosexual activity, our alternatives for everyday procedures are quite limited. We could execute some 10 million Americans, a prospect that might benefit no one but quarry workers. More reasonably, we either can confine all the practicing homosexuals we catch in a prison or hospital-prison where they will serve their time as homosexuals and, if released at all, will be released as homosexuals; or, we can declare that homosexual acts between consenting adults, in private, are the participants' concern and nobody else's business. In any case, we can be certain that our children will have homosexuals as their friends and neighbors. Our neighbors' children will face the same prospect.

Making the Violent Scene

A SIGN FOR CAIN. An Exploration of Human Violence. *By Fredric Wertham, M.D. The Macmillan Co. 391 pp. $6.95.*
THE BOSTON STRANGLER. *By Gerold Frank. The New American Library. 364 pp. $5.95.*

MARTIN LEBOWITZ
Mr. Lebowitz has contributed to The Journal of Philosophy, The Kenyon Review *and other publications, and to two anthologies*: The Critics' Notebook (*University of Minnesota*) *and* The Kenyon Critics (*World*).

For Fredric Wertham, this is "the age of violence." His interpretation of violence is socio-economic rather than Freudian; and he confidently anticipates the ultimate goal of nonviolence, although he is hardly explicit about the means of achieving it. While praising Thoreau, Gandhi and Martin Luther King, he observes: "Elevating nonviolence in our time to a universal principle may give the oppressor the assurance that he can practice violence with impunity. . . . Would it have helped the people in Auschwitz . . . if they had marched in peaceful demonstrations?" Wertham's familiar antagonists—the arsenal of contemporary violence—are all present: comic books, movies, television, literature, painting, journalism, advertising, alcohol, the toy industry, automobiles, fascism, colonialism, race prejudice and, to a degree, science and technology. He even permits himself a mild reference to "private enterprise," and he quotes Henry James on American business: "its boundless ferocity of battle." The American city is by far the most criminally violent community in the world, and growing worse; yet American society has outwardly appeared, until recently, to be the most benign. Are these two circumstances related?

Wertham quotes a text edited by a Harvard professor: "Necessary to the concept of self-actualization is . . . a certain promise of necessary violence, even of ferocity." I suspect that this statement must be understood in a context of sexuality, but it is high time that someone seriously inquired what constitutes self-actualization and why it appears so desirable. Clearly, from the standpoint of Wertham's sociology, it isn't. It is evident that self-actualization meant something to Aristotle and no doubt to Hegel that it no longer means to us, for their view of reality was profoundly teleological.

Wertham is convinced that there are no inborn traits of hostility, cruelty or aggression; they differ, in this sense, from sexuality. Rather, "we have to learn . . . that [violence] is linked by a thousand threads to the present fabric of our social and institutional life." He criticizes psychiatry itself for disseminating the ostensibly enlightened view that aggression is a necessary "outlet." No less a practitioner than the late Gregory Zilboorg is quoted to the effect that Hitler's Germany must be allowed to live out its malevolence. Soldiers fight, says Wertham, not because they have sadistic trends but because they are drafted. Concerning the re-education of the delinquent, Wertham notes: "The main problem here is that

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in a violence-saturated society, it may be necessary also to re-educate the re-educators." He speaks at length of the high profits made by German industrialists on the slave labor obtained from concentration camps. Wertham is clearly of the opinion that most crimes are committed in the name of law and order; and he cogently quotes C. P. Snow to that effect.

But Wertham's main example of the violence of respectability is his chapter on the German "euthanasia" murders of nearly all the inmates of its mental institutions; it is estimated that half these victims could have recovered. For the murderers in this instance were not bureaucrats or highly appointed Nazis but the psychiatric profession, acting, by and large, on its own initiative. He points out that the idea did not originate with the Nazis but in a book published in Leipzig in 1920, written by Binding and Hoche, a jurist and a psychiatrist. Wertham also observes that a recent work called *Euthanasia and Destruction of Life Devoid of Value*, by a Marburg professor, is highly recommended in an American psychiatric journal.

Much or most of the violence Wertham discusses—particularly juvenile delinquency—is due, no doubt, to the "passivity" that society undertakes to induce in the individual—stringent patterns of experience, sociability and endeavor which intensify, distort or suppress the natural—and seminal—diversity of character. When Wertham speaks of "social conditions," "socioeconomic factors" and cultural history in relation to modern violence, he is writing in part of the *mystique* of the American frontier, but mostly of the "dynamics" of capitalism. The irony is that a sufficiently affluent society can approximate and at least make tangible to the imagination not only the Jeffersonian ideal of governmental nonviolence but also the ultimate ideal of Marx.

On the question of mental or legal competence in criminal cases, Wertham is strongly opposed to such innovations as the Durham rule advocated by Judge Bazelon, the irresistible-impulse doctrine, and the new law enacted in New York State in 1965, a revision of the original McNaughton rule. The McNaughton rule, pronounced in England in 1843, maintains that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be . . . proved that . . . the party accused . . . (did not) know . . . the nature and quality of the act . . . (or) that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong." The Durham rule bases legal insanity on a demonstration, merely, that the crime was a product of mental disease. As Wertham says, it is a principle which, though not widely accepted, has been the subject of fruitful discussion and intelligent praise. Wertham also points out that a principle comparable to the Durham rule has been adopted in the Soviet Union.

But the trouble with the Durham rule, and perhaps ultimately with the McNaughton rule, though to a lesser degree, is that the tendency of reflection (or speculation) in this field is to establish and to identify the determinism, presumably pathological, of *all* violence. Wertham writes, for example, of violence as the "cancer of *society*." Indeed, speaking of enlightenment, if one accepts the hypothesis of psychic or behavioral determinism, as most psychologists do, it might well appear that, at least in some instances, crime resulting from "disease" (crimes of sadism, essentially) is especially flagrant and punishable.

But the legal and moral difficulty of defining a rational attitude toward crime is complicated by the practical question of what, if anything, constitutes a proper deterrent. Wertham notes that "in our society, as Warden Lewis E. Lawes of Sing Sing used to point out, capital punishment is applied mostly to the underprivileged and friendless. . . . If you abrogate capital punishment and do not change the conditions that lead to violence, it can always be reinstated. Ten American states have abolished capital punishment and reintroduced it. Chile gave it up and then introduced it again. Soviet Russia has prohibited it three times and restored it three times."

Our modern sense of reality as "dynamic" and "relativistic" is largely due, perhaps, to the emergence of politics in the 19th century as the paradigm of social and indeed of moral objectivity. Lenin wrote that law is politics, and Peirce, the father of pragmatism, said much the same of natural science: ". . . the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth." Santayana noted years ago the relation between egoism and aggression, and schizophrenia is certainly, if anything, subjectivistic. It is not the exaggerated and excessively maligned nihilism or absence of values in modern life that accounts for violence but the seeming necessity of egoism or activism—the compulsive morality of systematic subjectivism implicit in the emotional and intellectual intensity of romanticism. And the confusion incident to this morality is also frequently responsible for violence. As in the case of Raskolnikov, it is a phenomenon which, even when "nonpolitical," is nonetheless a political parable or pantomime.

I have endeavored to indicate that *A Sign for Cain* is an exceptionally cultivated book, humane, sensitive, intelligent and remarkably well informed. It merits the attention of everyone. *The Boston Strangler*, however, is the sort of book one recommends with trepidation after reading Wertham. Indeed, Wertham might say that there are overtones of misogyny in Gerold Frank's choice of subject matter, which has in earlier books included a succession of prominent women, Zsa Zsa Gabor, Lillian Roth, Diana Barrymore, Sheilah Graham. But the book is surely noteworthy. It has a novelistic quality—superior, in one sense, to that of detective fiction and journalism—to the extent that it generates an intensely physical and moral atmosphere: the tangible and precise details of suspense are translatable into moral anger and physical curiosity. A profound consciousness of pathology is created not only by the crimes and the extreme psychiatric preoccupation of the investigators (together with their occasional oddity and possible criminality) but also by the inevitable aberrance of the numerous suspects, the "medical" status of some of them, and the recurrent association of the victims themselves with nursing, institutions, mental and sexual abnormality, promiscuity, etc., along with the foreseeable variety of crackbrained confessions and efforts to help the police, one of which culminated in suicide. We experience, in short, the reality of a sick society.

And the story is amazing. It concerns the three-year hunt, commencing in 1962, for the "maniacal" murderer of thirteen women, the most intensive criminal investigation on record, and surely one of the most notorious criminals. Gerold Frank reports it as:

> . . . the greatest manhunt in the history of modern crime, using every technique of detection, natural and supernatural: computers, clairvoyants, "sensitives," men and women claiming ESP powers, psychiatrists armed with hypnotic drugs, hallucinating agents, and truth serums, specialists in anthropology, graphology, forensic law. . . .
>
> The search would involve the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the FBI . . . through it would run local political jealousies and national political hopes. It would set wives against husbands, neighbor against neighbor, translating the sexual frustrations of men and women into acts astonishing and bizarre . . . an entire city would be stripped bare.

Is the purported killer, Albert De Salvo, really psychotic? The crimes, if he committed them, were apparently due to his excessive sexual need and the hostility of his wife, who scorned and re-

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pudiated his advances, especially since the birth of a crippled daughter had made her fearful of further pregnancy.

Indeed, it is worse than ironic that De Salvo's crimes can be taken to express his flamboyant, rather than his maniacal, emotionality. The evidence that he is the Strangler exists in his confession—accurate enough to be corroborated by facts known to the police but withheld from the newspapers—but is legally invalid because of recent Supreme Court rulings. Thus, there is no way to dispose of him safely except to detain him for life in a mental hospital. Wertham doubtless wonders about a society whose guilt is such as to create an anomalous immunity for its criminals. Some years from now it might well appear anomalous that "society" was considered sacrosanct.

Letter from Prague

JOSE YGLESIAS
Mr. Yglesias recently spent three weeks in Prague.

Every writer you meet in Prague will tell you that at the 13th Party Congress held last year not one word was said about Socialist realism in its long statement on the development of Socialist culture. I obtained an English translation—or, rather, an English approximation—of all the resolutions of the congress, and did not find the phrase used once in the 23 pages devoted to culture. The congress was somewhat worried about "liberalism," but every attack on it is carefully balanced by as strong a criticism of sectarian and dogmatic views—to the point that it blames "liberalism" for the revival among some critics of "harmful conservative views." "It was those who had a direct share in the faults of the fifties," the resolution states candidly in its wayward English, "trying more than once later, following the 20th Congress of the CPSU, to prove that their reversal is permanent and convincing, who adopted in their argumentation the vocabulary of, and with it, the standpoint of bourgeois propaganda and of various doctrines fighting against socialism and communism."

For the party there is a fundamental conflict between democracy and liberalism. "Democratization, for which the party endeavors—in accordance with Leninist ideas—means to expand the organized participation of the many in power, and in management and administration," says the cultural resolution; "liberalism, on the contrary, means only equalization of conflicting views, regardless of their value, legalization of nonobligatory opinions and political irresponsibility."

Classical Marxist ideas in the field of culture are stated almost defensively. "It happened lately that certain individuals considered any mention of ideology or ethics to be an expression of dogmatism. . . . An evaluation of art from an ideological and ethical point of view . . . is inherent in art and turns up again in history with new forms. A world outlook or philosophical system has a basic inimitable importance for art. It determines the content and structure of artistic expression and thus also its aesthetic influence. Without a world outlook no work of art which is of service to life can be created."

Having done its duty to theory, the resolution goes on to considerations that account for the extraordinary amount of activity visible in Prague in the theatre, films, books, art galleries. It talks about the exploratory nature of art, the need to develop what it calls "aesthetic perceptibility" among the people, to encourage conditions favorable to artistic creations of "multiform variety of forms"; it asks the different artists' unions to insure "that artistic competition is really free"; and even asserts that "difficult, unusual, revealing works can achieve wide popularity"; though it adds "if they carry the answer to questions of great social significance . . . and are created in a way allowing them to become the property of broad society strata." And, given the new economic law to go into effect this month that attempts to put all enterprises on a self-sustaining basis, the resolution defends the allocations to education and culture as ones which "cannot simply be looked upon as unnecessary, unproductive expenditures."

All these are, of course, formal pronouncements, and I cannot say whether intellectuals pointed out the absence of the phrase "Socialist realism" because this would have special significance for me or because it did for them. Probably for both reasons. The Czechs, who are not given to tooting their own horn or to bursts of enthusiasm, also informed me that no other Socialist country had yet made a statement to compare with it; that is, one with so wide a latitude for artists.

If to Czechs the resolution means relaxation, to Western intellectuals the balanced statements will seem a hedge against experimentation. The only way to verify it, then, is to look at the activity going on in Prague. The art galleries show the work of abstract expressionists and figurative painters; even when naturalistic they are by no means the illustrated stories dear to Soviet art; I saw no Pop art, however, and Op seemed confined to two or three shopping bags; yet there were many Picasso-like ceramics in the crowded art shops. Of the dozens of plays being produced last November the repertory ran to classical plays (Lope de Vega, Shakespeare, Machiavelli), turn of the century (Gorki, Shaw, Turgenev, Strindberg, Ibsen), moderns of all types (Miller, Pirandello, Dürrenmatt, Albee, Giraudoux, Tennessee Williams, O'Neill, Schisgal, Ionesco); there were Viennese operettas, Cole Porter musicals, Agatha Christie mysteries, Lonsdale comedies and, of course, *My Fair Lady*.

In the windows of the bookstores—there seem to be as many as newsstands in New York—are Czech translations of Sarraute, Robbe-Grillet, de Beauvoir, Camus; and Czechs, in their diffident manner, modify their advice that their language is impenetrable with the recommendation that it is worth learning Czech for the interesting experimental verse be-

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ing written by their young poets. A current, long-playing record of verses by four Czech poets, translated into Spanish and read by Cuban actors, shows that they are not startling in their idiom; but it is surprising that their work is contemporary—in the best sense—with our own poets. Czechs complain that the tourists are crowding them out of the Lanterna Magica theatre: a fascinating amalgam of film, music, mime and dance, which did not do well in New York three years ago, probably because it requires the kind of specialized small house cleverly designed for it in Prague. The Czechs are mad for jazz—one magazine is entirely devoted to it—and you can hear The New Thing on radio and records.

The amount of foreign literature translated in this country of only 14 million people is extraordinary: for last summer's P.E.N. International Congress, the Writers' Union published a 77-page book, listing translations of American writers since the end of the war. Despite some vagaries (due to the Stalin period and to the three-year period before the 1948 revolution canceled commercial houses) the list is admirably catholic. The various publishers now have a more orderly program for publication of foreign fiction, I was told; but when I looked into it, there seemed to be considerable scrambling by the different houses for favorite authors. Mlada Fronta, the publishing house of the youth organizations, published, for example, Carlos Fuentes' *Death of Artemio Cruz*; one of its editors informed me that they felt its experimental style should be of particular interest to young people. What about its purple passages? I asked. She laughed.

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SPACES

1. Quickening his step, my father
Came into the room.
"Now I will tell you about myself,"
He said.
When I write these words,
A torpor comes over me.
I can hardly hold the pen.

2. If you want to become a wall,
Work at it. More plaster, I mean,
And more paint.
Get the job done.

3. To be summoned like that
Startles me.
I put on the light
At two AM
And stand
At the edge of a field.

4. Putting words
To these sounds,
You have your own
Victory.
But to recognize it.

HARVEY SHAPIRO

When I suggested that perhaps, like our editors, they too take the agents out to lunch to put in their bids (in Czechoslovakia one central agency, DILIA, handles all rights to foreign writers and the foreign rights of Czech writers), they insisted that the date of a letter asking for the translation rights settles any clashes among publishing houses.

At the State Publishing House, which is directly responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, I said that I assumed their staff all belonged to the party, and was told by one of its top men that he believed that should be the case but that when an opening occurs they are quite willing to take, as the Russians used to say, a nonparty Bolshevik. I had also assumed that this house published only Marxist studies and political propaganda, but found that their 1966 booklist included John Galbraith, Sartre, Arthur Miller, Alan Sillitoe. "In his book, Sartre explains the Hungarian events of 1956 as a case of Soviet military intervention," said the editor, "and we are publishing that without comment."

In November, every bookstore was sure to carry Josef Skvorecky's *The Cowards*, a novel first published in 1958 and withdrawn the same year because of the many attacks it inspired from the party. The story of a town in northern Bohemia during the last days of the war, it was not kind to patriots who strutted when the town was liberated from tired and scared German troops, but who scurried for cover when an elite S.S. marched into Czechoslovakia for a last-ditch stand; it was the hooligan elements of the town who, ironically, fought the S.S. then. The novel outraged those still longing for Zhdanov's positive literature, and even army officers went on the air to denounce it. Today, Skvorecky, who is not a member of the party, has been apologized to by everyone, there is a large new printing of the book, and everybody is proud of the fact that in 1958 the publishing house for which he worked was courageous enough to keep him on its staff.

Having talked to young people at the Viola, a night club whose specialty is *avant-garde* poetry read aloud, and having heard in the course of their complaints that people got "into trouble" for their work or views, I decided to look into it. I asked about Jan Zabrana, a poet who is the translator of Allen Ginsberg, Corso, Ferlinghetti, as well as of Warren Miller's *The Cool World*. I had been told he had been in trouble about Ginsberg's stay in Prague in 1965. Ginsberg's diary was stolen, passages were quoted in the newspapers, and he was questioned by the police and asked to leave the country. I asked two Czech intellectuals whom I completely trusted just what being "in trouble" meant in Zabrana's case. They happened to be friends of Zabrana, and laughed at my notion that he might be under house arrest;

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Zabrana was holed up in a new apartment with so much work that he was probably making more money than most Czech writers.

They explained that the Ginsberg case was even more interesting than the kids at the Viola imagined. They reported Ginsberg's visit as a two-act affair. When he arrived from Cuba, he got a visa at the airport within an hour, called DILIA and found he had royalties coming to him from a forthcoming book, and his first evening in Prague wandered into the Viola where his work was being read that night. The Writers' Union tendered him, after a few days, an official invitation, which means they picked up his hotel tab; and the newspapers were full of admiring articles, the first one published appearing in *Rude Pravo*, the official organ of the party. It was on his return from a trip to the Soviet Union a little later that Ginsberg became unpopular with the Czech authorities, who professed themselves annoyed with his alleged demands for narcotics and his behavior with young men who were technically minors. In the aftermath, the party asked leaders of the Writers' Union to discuss the case with those who had been close to Ginsberg or had written uncritically praising articles about him.

"That was the extent of the trouble people got into," the Czech intellectual assured me, himself the author of one of the articles. "I have been in New York and know the dark thoughts you have when you hear the phrase, but there is a great difference between the dry phrasing of a party resolution and the way it works out in life."

Another Czech artist told me about a friend, an editor of an important magazine, who has been in trouble with the ideological section of the party all year. They had been criticizing various articles he had published for what they considered was a shallow appraisal of "the faults of the fifties," and the discussions finally reached an impasse. The editor was relieved of his position for six months and given a grant to replace his salary; he will be doing his own work and is not prevented from publishing elsewhere. "What does the party hope to accomplish by that?" I asked. The artist smiled wryly and said: "Sometimes they just hope the issue will blow over by the time the editor returns to his job."

More ominous is the censorship law scheduled to take effect this year, one which my Czech friends do not like to call a censorship law if only because it also provides a legal definition for libel that they tell me was much needed. Nevertheless, in the future, publications will submit all copy in galleys to the ideological section of the party and, when there is political disagreement, the party can ask for postponement of the particular article's publication. The law calls for discussions with the editors and for appeal by the editors, when they do not agree, all the way up, I was told, to the Central Committee. I could imagine a war of attrition being waged against a particular publication or writer, but my Czech friends would not agree.

"The law gives us the right to engage the party in a dialogue," they said. "They will have to defend their position."

I appealed to them as writers: Weren't editors bad enough? Why should someone else also pass on their copy? They laughed, but their tone indicated that was a frivolous objection. I then asked: "Did you ask for this law? Did you want it?"

They shook their heads. "We did not ask for it, but we are going to use it. The de-Stalinization came slowly here, but we are geared to gaining more and more freedoms. Always, of course, within the framework of socialism."

A foreigner who has been living in Prague for ten years confirmed that the gains—most evident in the cultural life—cannot be canceled. "The dismantling of Stalin's statue—they had to dynamite his head, it was so hard—was a trauma and a kind of liberation. It brought bad things—the apathy and anti-political attitudes of the youth, their skepticism about socialism's claims, all sorts of problems. But good things too: the party may not function in what you think is a more democratic manner, but it now really listens to the people and is trying to do something about what it hears."

Meanwhile writers and editors, party and nonparty, complain as much as any ordinary citizen. If you praise their book designing, they tell you they have to be good because the printing is bad. If you tell them how good it is that they publish so many foreign writers, they tell you the paper shortage frequently forces them to keep first editions of foreign works down to 10,000. If you say that the bookstores are more than adequately stocked, they complain that publication of a book takes as much as ten months to a year.

"Sometimes I wish there weren't so much discussion about all the shortcomings and problems," a housewife said to me. "Every day you read in the newspapers that the bread at such and such a bakery is not up to standard, that service at a department store is inefficient, that the renovation of the old buildings is too slow. You get to feel that everything is wrong. In Stalin's time, life was simpler in a way: you heard only one thing—that everything was going well—and you went about your work."

"It was simpler," said the husband, "but the economy was almost run into the ground."

Like good Czechs, they worried about that for a while. Then the husband smiled and said that a foreign visitor had told him that the truest image of a Czech was of a man in one of the fine old taverns of the city drinking a large mug of superb Pilsener and saying with a sad face: "Yes, we have problems."

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

Contemporary London has won a name for being the most sophisticated of the European capital cities. It appears to occupy the position, roughly, of Berlin in the period of the Isherwood stories. Absolved of power, its rising generations have discovered again the flamboyance that always gave a hint of scarlet and lace to the gray serge of dominion. London today is gyrating to a Restoration clad in vinyl.

That, in any case, is the temper Michelangelo Antonioni has caught in *Blow-Up*, his first English-language picture and very possibly his most alluring work to date. It is a witty interweaving of dream and reality with the expectations reversed—dream being the ground on which the picture operates, reality the elusive substance for which it grasps in vain. *Blow-Up* is Gothic romance—violently picturesque and innocently wicked—recited in the Mod vernacular.

The picture proclaims Vanessa Redgrave its star, but with all respect for the attractions of her enigmatic candor and strained beauty, the billing seems more an acknowledgment of her name than of her weight on the movie. She

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

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triggers the plot, but the style, scope and mounting pressure of the film reside entirely in a young man named David Hemmings. He and Antonioni have created between them the mint image of a current Anglo-American type who makes the languorous fascinations of a Mastroianni seem country stuff. It is the con man of "in" society, the fellow who works the angles of the *avant-garde*.

The hero in this case is a fashion photographer, long-haired, tight-trousered, running on keyed-up exhaustion, coining money out of contemptuous virtuosity and a cynical instinct for what will turn the squares on. If you can imagine an Andy Warhol with sufficient vitamins, that is close.

Antonioni has devised a superb lair for this deceptive cat to prowl. His photo studio and laboratories seem to be hung as a maze of boxes and gangways on the walls of some enormous, abandoned refrigerator plant or slaughterhouse. The colors are acrylic creamy, but the angles are intimidating, and the design seems premeditated to make lay figures of everyone who works or strays within these walls except the blond, ex-slum-boy master of the place. He uses it as a huge machine, his command of its gadgetry giving him a kind of demigod's advantage over the "birds" he photographs and the females who smell him out. Part of the brilliance of Hemmings' characterization is his physical dexterity. He makes a dance of taking pictures, when he doesn't make a rape of it, and he uses cameras as though he had spent his life with them. With a camera in his hands, he is a kind of intoxicated faun; without it, he becomes a mere athlete, adept at the game of taking people by surprise.

Photography is the avocation as well as the livelihood of this aesthetic hipster. He is putting together a city picture book —one of those dissections of civic malignity—and one day in a high and windy park he finds Vanessa Redgrave with a graying lover. The sequence he shoots is to provide a conclusion to the book; but when he develops the film, far, far back in one of the frames is a pinpoint of reality which he blows up, enlargement upon enlargement (the darkroom scenes are a solo suspense ballet), into a wall-sized explosive tableau. The young man goes out to run down the facts of his discovery—but that takes him away from the studio, where he manipuates the fantasy, into streets over whose logic he has no control. What he saw in the negative is gone, if it was ever there. The jeepload of mimes who careened through the opening sequences of the picture catch up with Hemmings again at the end, and draw him into their conspiracy of the invisible event.

The film comes a clean full circle through a coolly logical extravagance of invention. The trickster is baffled, the dream prevails, and the last laugh belongs to whoever feels bold enough to utter it. *Blow-Up* is a work of wit and caustic intelligence, superbly disciplined, elegantly styled, visually astonishing and, for all that, turned out with the deceptive simplicity of perfect craftsmanship.

LETTERS *(continued from page 34)*

tween the necessary and rational solutions to our health problems and the private enterprise methods of dispensing medical care. *Hyman M. Gold, M.D.*

Stamford, Conn.

DEAR SIRS: Selig Greenberg is using a purely propaganda technique when he says that there are "reliable reports" that fees for the elderly have been boosted in some cases by 300 per cent by physicians because of Medicare. "What greedy physicians!," he is telling you. The 300 per cent rise, it has been shown, was when physicians stopped their voluntary one-third charity fee to some of their elderly patients because the government was going to now pay the regular fee.

Joel M. Berns, D.M.D.

Providence, R.I.

DEAR SIRS: As I understand his letter, Dr. Berns does not deny that physicians are making much more money under Medicare than ever before. His claim merely is that some doctors who formerly were treating their needy, elderly patients at reduced fees or gratis are now collecting regular fees. There is ample evidence that such fees have been boosted by many physicians throughout the country to take advantage of the federal government's decision to pay the doctors whatever they say their "reasonable charges" are. The end result is that physicians are now not only being paid fully for what they previously did for nothing or for token fees but are charging their other patients more as well.

Selig Greenberg

down with Percy

Park Ridge, Ill.

DEAR SIRS: "On balance, the liberal-moderate element in the (Republican) Party has been strengthened . . . most particularly, by the victories of . . . Charles Percy . . ." [*Nation* editorial, Nov. 21].

In my opinion *The Nation* grossly errs in complacently accepting the election of Percy as anything less than a disaster to the hopes of human dignity, economic opportunity and equitable social justice. . . .

While I have been totally disillusioned by the inept Senator Douglas' position on foreign relations issues, I believe his great reputation as a servant of his constituency was deserved. Percy has not at any time in his political life demonstrated the depth or the competence that would merit that kind of recognition. . . .

This "liberal-moderate" Republican, Percy, will be, predictably, a cheap imitation Dirksen—without, of course, Dirksen's ability or his macabre personality or his relatively honest and open dedication to reactionary principles. *Henry J. Dillon*

Sunset caper

Encino, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: Really at issue in the Sunset Strip caper is a struggle for economic survival. One set of entrepreneurs —office buildings, banks, restaurants, shops and night clubs—catering to one kind of patron, is fighting for ground space against another type of entrepreneur—the new clubs and shops—catering to another type of patron. Unfortunately, the former are part of the established adult community, whereas the latter, and the young people whom they serve, are both outside the power structure and an implicit threat to it.

Instead of encouraging the free enterprise system to operate so that one or the other group of entrepreneurs will eventually stand, fall, or adapt to the new business situation . . . the power of the state has yielded, with apparent enthusiasm, to the pressure from the older group and has taken sides on the pretext of controlling rowdyism and anti-social behavior among the young longhairs. . . . The police have become a party to this travesty of American capitalism by seizing on a minor incident of youthful exuberance to manhandle children in the name of an archaic curfew law. The effect is restraint of trade. . . . *Leon Levitt*

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